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When seeking to protect reputation there are different arguments available. The primary route is 
defamation because it is the tort that has been devised to protect reputation. Due to its longer 
history, defamation also stands out as the most recognisable. This tort has evolved more recently. 
It is now discussed as an action that balances reputation and free speech; where this balance is 
concerned in particular with free speech considerations that can attenuate the recourse an 
aggrieved individual may have in bringing a claim in defamation. The next option seems to be 
privacy-based. An action based upon some form of privacy is likely to be pursued where there 
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may be a questionable defamation claim (such as, the remarks are within the growing spectrum 
of the defamation defences such as fair comment or responsible publication on a matter of public 
interest). The nature of the privacy action is nuanced (more so than defamation with its slander 
and libel elements). There are different aspects to privacy that are protected – though they each 
have varying levels of strength in the law. For example, if the aggrieved believes that 
information was wrongfully disclosed, an action in breach of confidence may be pursued (in 
Canada this has been treated as a hybrid of tort and equity) because the information had been 
disclosed in a confidential setting (i.e. not for broadcast to others). Another aspect of privacy is 
data protection. This too is a matter of disclosure because it deals with the propriety of 
dissemination of data. It may also include the way in which personal data is processed.  
 
The connection amongst defamation, privacy and data protection is viewed as the next stage in 
the development of the law’s engagement with reputation issues. It is envisioned that the tort of 
defamation will be limited as a means of redress.1 There are robust (and developing) defences 
within this tort designed to protect a wider range of speech. The impact of these defences is that 
even speech that may satisfy the criteria for the tort will still be excused based on the imperative 
of free speech. As a result, defamation may not always be a viable claim when reputation has 
allegedly been harmed using internet-based forms of communication. Where the remarks made 
fall outside of the parameters of defamation (taking the perspective of the plaintiff seeking 
redress for perceived reputational harm), there will be a search for other tools the law may 
provide. To this end, claims in breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental distress and 
invasion of privacy are canvassed. Of these actions, breach of confidence and invasion of privacy 
will be explored in greater detail.  
 
An action based upon privacy will be used where information is disclosed (i.e. published or 
passed on to others in some form) that may ‘harm’ reputation. The likely claim is that the 
information was obtained or released through some breach of privacy. The alleged contravention 
may be defined as either physical or informational (though there is overlap). Breach of physical 
privacy would arise where there is a breach of physical space wherein there was an expectation 
of privacy (for example a photograph of an individual in a bathroom). Breach of informational 
privacy focuses on disclosure of information intended to be kept private. Here, information 
gained through confidence or information lawfully collected but misused in some way would be 
examples. There is overlap amongst these areas. Breach of physical privacy may also entail 
breach of informational privacy. Returning to the example of the photograph of an individual in a 
bathroom, the dissemination of a picture of the naked individual would breach physical privacy 
(i.e. a photograph where the individual clearly has an expectation of not being photographed) but 
also informational privacy (i.e. information which can be gleaned from the sight of the naked 
individual, such as medical information). There is also an overlap within the second form of 
breach of privacy with other torts. Breach of confidence can arise when information obtained in 
confidence is disclosed. Disclosure of medical information alludes to the developing tort of 
misuse of private information, as outlined in the UK. Further to the point of informational 
privacy, data protection enters the consideration.   
 
As the call for papers has mandated, this research engages with the theoretical aspects of privacy 
and reputation as well as their connection with defamation. This theoretical overview will 
1 The focus of this discussion is on the public and not those who would be deemed public figures, such as celebrities, 
politicians, certain businesspeople. Those who are public figures because of their online presence are included in the 
public here because this cohort can provide some further guidance regarding the remit of the present work.  
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foreground a comparative analysis of the constitutional protection of privacy and reputational 
rights. A useful frame of reference here will be the law in the U.K. and E.U. (particularly 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights) because there has been a pronounced 
engagement with defamation and the protection of privacy through the interpretation of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (articles 8 (privacy) and 10 (freedom of 
speech)). The touchstone for these discussions remains their implications for the law of 
defamation (in Ontario) in an era that stretches the boundaries of this tort from its origins in print 
media. To that end, guidance is taken from the practice of law where it is foreseen that pleadings 
in this area will increasingly be packaged together; that is, a claim in both defamation and in 
privacy is anticipated, thereby necessitating careful work by the courts in discerning the differing 
objectives of the claims.  
 
II. Jurisdictions considered 
An aim of the research is to situate Canada (and Ontario where possible) within a multi-
jurisdictional context. This effort will go some ways towards also placing defamation in the age 
of the internet within trends emerging in the twenty-first century. One trend, of which Canadian 
courts have partaken, is a wider spectrum for the protection of free speech.2  
 
Used as an entry point for discussion, reforms in the English law of defamation have been 
promulgated for the purpose of extending protection of free speech. Consequently, there is a 
more singular focus and one that (for some) recedes from balancing the competing goods of free 
speech and protection of reputation. Decisions from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) contrast with English law: where the latter is viewed as emphasizing free speech, the 
ECtHR is seen as being more protective of reputation. These two jurisdictions offer admirable 
resources in moving towards a more balanced framework that better responds to the landscape as 
altered by the internet. ECtHR decisions are used sporadically here to underpin principles in 
conjunction with UK jurisprudence. 
 
Finally, the American approach remains a consideration. This is not because it may be followed 
outright. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sullivan v New York Times remains 
the benchmark for those advancing a less fettered (if any) system for free speech. This approach, 
though, leaves open the question to what extent privacy is protected. The landmark nature of the 
US Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v New York Times3 is well-established. The later case 
of Time v Hill4 involved a claim in which defamation and privacy arguments were intertwined. 
The combination of these two decisions set a particular trajectory for the combination of these 
two private law actions in the country.5 Aside from the United States, common law countries 
have been engaged in expanding the scope for freedom of speech, notably since the turn of the 
21st century. The Sullivan model has been considered in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. In each instance, it has been rejected in favour of what these courts view as a 
2 On this topic, see the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Grant v Torstar Group 2009 SCC 61. The court took 
guidance from the law of other jurisdictions which “have modified the law of defamation to give more protection to 
the press, in recognition of the fact that the traditional rules inappropriately chill free speech”: Grant [40]. The point 
was repeated in Bou Malhab v Diffusion Metromedia CMR Inc. 2011 SCC 9, [21]. Bou Malhab was a case which 
turned on the application of the Quebec Charter and the Civil Code.   
3 376 US 254 (1964). 
4 385 US 374 (1967). 
5 This matter is studied further in Andrew T. Kenyon and Megan Richardson, “Reverberations of Sullivan? 
Considering defamation and privacy law reform” in Andrew T. Kenyon (ed) Comparative Defamation and Privacy 
Law (Cambridge: CUP 2016) 331-353. 
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more balanced system. The critic may point to this development as the essence of the point: libel 
law was too firmly entrenched in favour of the plaintiff. Tort textbooks have tended to write of 
defamation as a tort, the primary purpose of which is to protect the good reputations of 
individuals.6 And yet, the premise of defamation has in Canada and the UK (as well as the 
European Union) seems to be that of balancing of reputation (itself given weight through s.7 of 
the Charter and art.8 of the ECHR) with the right to free speech (s.2(b) and Art.10 of the ECHR).  
 
III. The tort of defamation in the internet age 
The Law Commission’s project engages with a remarkably varied area. As such, the call for 
proposals is understood to contain discrete areas for discussion within this topic. Still, these areas 
are linked and it is this connection that is of importance at the outset of the present study. The 
present work focuses on comments made by identifiable individuals. 7  It is understood that 
another portion of the call specifically deals with the topic of anonymity in defamation. There 
will be overlap with two other areas of the call for proposals: Revisiting the Core Elements of 
Defamation Law, Too Late to Change? as well as Bridging the Technological/Doctrinal Divide: 
How the Technology Behind Internet Communications Impacts Defamation Law Doctrine. These 
two topics are foundational by nature; that is, they engage with the substance of defamation law 
in the internet age. Below is an overview the tort of defamation (focusing on libel) which 
incorporates discussion of these two topics.  
 
Defamation remains a civil action which fits uneasily within the spectrum of tort law.8 And so, it 
has remained a rather nebulous concept within tort. The present offers an admirable opportunity 
to engage anew with defamation as a tort based upon the impact of internet communications. In 
this section, these interlinked points will be elaborated upon; but with the caution prompted by 
Professor Barendt’s article which remains a lingering question today, “What is the point of libel 
law?”9 Defamation’s ‘essential’ purpose has been described as protecting reputation from harm 
by false statements.10 This classification as it applies to tort requires unpacking.  
 
(i) Defamation’s private law evolution   
Once the common law courts took jurisdiction of defamation (from the Star Chamber), the view 
emerged that the written form was of a greater concern. In King v Lake11 Hale C.B. ruled that the 
6 Allen M Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 10th ed (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2015), 791; Robert 
Solomon, Mitchell McInnes, Erika Chamberlain and Stephen Pitel, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 9th ed 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2015) [Solomon et al], 1075. 
7 Though it is limited to the legal avenues noted above, there may be other areas of law which also apply depending 
on the facts, such as copyright or other intellectual property-based claims. The topic is discussed in Alexandra Couto, 
“Freedom of expression, freedom of information IP rights in the age of ICT” in Mireille Hildebrandt and Bibi van 
der Bert (eds) Information, Freedom and Property (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), 131-150; as well as, in Stephen Bate 
and Gervase de Wilde, “Copyright, Moral Rights, and The Right to One’s Image” in N.A. Moreham and Sir Mark 
Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford: OUP, 2016), Chapter 9.  
8 The fact that both the plaintiff and defendant may simultaneously plead the matter of reputation underlines the 
uniqueness of this tort. In Awan v Levant 2016 ONCA 970, the defendant (appellant) argued that he had a 
“reputation as a right-wing provocateur” as a means of defending against the plaintiff’s defamation claim.  
9 (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 110. 
10 Gavin Millar QC and Andrew Scott, Newsgathering: Law, Regulation and the Public Interest (Oxford: OUP 
2016), [17.03]. 
11 (1668) Hardr 470.   
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written form “contains more malice than if they had been once spoken”.12 The finding contrasted 
with what would have occurred if the matter had been slander: “although such words spoken 
once, without writing or publish[ing] them, would not be actionable”. Kaye criticised taking this 
meaning from King and instead analysed the matter as one of malice.13 Professor Mitchell placed 
Kaye’s argument in doubt by suggesting the reading was inconsistent with Hale C.B.’s 
reasoning. 14  For some time, the matter remained unsettled, 15  though there was a hint of a 
continuing line with Villers v Monsley.16  
 
The emphasis on the written form by which we abide today was entrenched by 1812. The 
decision of Chief Justice Mansfield in Thorley v Lord Kerry17 marked a point of change in the 
courts’ attitude towards written and spoken forms of defamation. Identifying the precedent 
“established by some of the greatest names known to the law, Lord Hardwicke, Hale, … Holt 
…”, though contrary to his personal view,18 Mansfield C.J. concluded: “an action for a libel may 
be brought on words written, when the words, if spoken, would not sustain it”.19 The distinction 
owed to arguments such as “written scandal is more generally diffused than words spoken”.20 
Although the permanence of form allowed comments to be read by a wider audience, Mansfield 
C.J. was not entirely convinced as he contended making a remark in a public place “may be 
much more extensively diffused than a few printed papers dispersed”. 21  Harm has been a 
foundation as passed from the history of the law of defamation for application today and Bayley 
J. in Clement v Chivis encapsulated the point that writing is both “premeditated” and “is more 
permanent and calculated to do a much greater injury than slander merely spoken.”22 Underlying 
the notion of what may be viewed as the more egregious act of libel is that the written form is 
presumed to be undertaken concurrently with thinking about what is written; that is, there is 
some form of self-editing or reconsideration embedded within writing. As a result of this 
presumption, forceful terms are applied to the alleged defamer, notably falsehood (malice, in 
some instances). These words suggest a harsh certainty that is not in fact reflected in defamation 
adjudication; which is itself a much more nuanced process.  
 
A negative tone has developed in the understanding of defamation and it has led to a critical 
view of libel law; to the point that statements such as “[a]lmost all uncomplimentary comments 
12 Ibid 471. Another case that arises in readings is Austin v Culpepper (1683) 2 Show KB 313. The defendant had 
forged an order of the Chancery Court stating that Sir John Austin should ‘stand committed’. Culpepper’s conduct 
however should distinguish this decision.  
13 J.M. Kaye, ‘Libel and Slander – Two Torts or One?’ (1975) 91 LQR 524, 531. Note, there is no reference to Kaye 
in Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford: OUP, 2007) which is another notable source of the 
history of defamation. 
14 Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 5. The King court rejected the 
argument that no action where words were too vague and uncertain to cause loss because the words were written: 
Mitchell, 6. 
15 Ibid 8. 
16 (1769) 2 Wils KB 403. 
17 (1812) 4 Taunt 355. 
18 Ibid 366: ‘If the matter were for the first time to be decided at this day, I should have no hesitation in saying, that 
no action could be maintained for written scandal which could not be maintained for the words if they had been 
spoken’. 
19 Ibid 365. 
20 Ibid The point was made in Thomas Starkie, Law of Slander, Libel, Scandalum Magnatum, and False Rumours 
(1812), 126-44.   
21 Thorley 365. 
22 (1829) 9 B & C 172, 174. 
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are defamatory”23 are found in Canadian tort textbooks. These assessments speak of a plaintiff-
centred system. Increasing scrutiny of the tort is the view that it is “relatively easy for plaintiffs 
to make out a prima facie case of defamation”. 24  This line of critique takes aim at the 
determination of whether or not the impugned remark is defamatory (one of the three criteria for 
establishing a prima facie defamation claim). Adjudication of this point will likely be further 
examined as cases between parties that do not include news media organisations increase in 
number based upon capacities provided to individuals through internet-based communications. 
And yet, there may be points to identify for clarification purposes with regards to this tort, prior 
to continuing on to consider the influence of information technology on the future developments 
in protection of reputation.  
 
Defamation has long been taught as a strict liability tort.25 Like much of defamation law, there is 
a curious ambiguity to the notion. The aim here is to underscore that developments in 
information and communication technology offer an occasion to review the tort with a new 
perspective. In aid of that aim, it is worth briefly noting the challenge of situating defamation as 
a strict liability tort. 
 
Strict liability arises when the plaintiff has proven that the defendant caused her loss in the 
manner alleged and there are no defences excusing liability. 26  Part of the challenge with 
defamation is that it appears to be a right-based form of strict liability: imposing liability “on 
boundary crossings that may both do no harm and be entirely free of fault.”27 Battery is used to 
explain what is meant by strict liability absent harm or fault. No harm may be caused by the 
unlawful touching of another (with force beyond a de minimis threshold), but there remains a 
cause of action for the innocent party because their bodily integrity has been unlawfully violated. 
Strict liability is justified on the basis of infringement of control; here over the individual’s 
person. The difficulty with defamation is that there is a debateable amount of control an 
individual has over her reputation. Defamation may involve protection of the individual’s 
autonomy. And yet, reputation, based upon the criteria for establishing a defamation claim, 
includes an assessment of a person by others. A tort (let alone a strict liability tort) to protect 
such a difficult entity seems to be a challenging endeavour.  
 
These difficulties appear to have been weighed to a certain extent insofar as the concept itself 
can become compromised without a firm boundary. Professor Keating’s comments provide 
context: “They are rights to exclusive control over one’s person and one’s property, real and 
moveable. Liability for violation of a right of exclusive control is strict for the simple reason that 
the right itself would be fatally compromised by tolerating all reasonable (or justified) boundary 
crossings without regard to whether consent was given to those crossings.” 28  In debates 
regarding legislative changes to defamation in the UK, Lord MacKay anticipated Keating: “[the 
23 L.N. Klar, Tort Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2012), 789. This statement is quoted in Philip Osborne, The Law of Torts 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), 428. 
24 Solomon et al, 1090. A similar remark is also made at 1078. 
25 See texts such as Osborne, 428; Linden and Feldthusen, 816; 
26 Definitions in Canadian tort law texts speak to these criteria. Osborne, 358. In his Tort Law Cases and Materials 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2014), 579, Professor Weinrib defines strict liability as “the result of the defendant’s 
causation of the harm under particular circumstances rather than the defendant’s culpability.” This definition is set 
within the context of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher  
27 Gregory C. Keating, “Strict Liability Wrongs” in John Oberdiek (ed) Philosophical Foundations of the Law of 
Torts (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 296.   
28 Keating 298. 
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plaintiff] is the person who has the reputation, and if somebody is going to seek to deprive him 
of it, that person should be under the obligation to show that that deprivation is justified.”29 On 
this point, it is worth noting that altering the burden of proof had been contemplated when the 
Defamation Act 1996 was being debated in the UK. The proposed amendment was: "In an action 
for defamation, the burden shall be upon the plaintiff to prove that the defamatory words of 
which he complains are false." To this, Lord MacKay (the Lord Chancellor at the time) argued 
against the amendment: “The amendment would alter the whole structure of defamation law so 
that every hapless person against whom another chose to allege dishonesty, immorality, 
dishonourable conduct, incompetence and so forth would always have to prove his innocence in 
order to protect his reputation.”30  
 
As is well-known, there are three criteria the plaintiff must meet in order to establish a prima 
facie defamation claim (before applicable defences are considered). Looking at two of the three 
requirements, a defamatory remark and publication, there is a confusing disconnect when 
viewing defamation as a strict liability tort. To illustrate, the following definitions from the same 
text of each criteria (respectively) are used: 
“Liability in defamation is strict. The plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant intended to 
defame the plaintiff or that the defendant failed to take reasonable care in ascertaining the truth of the 
statement.”31 
“The strict liability for defamation is also alleviated to some degree by the requirement that the 
publication must be intentional or due to a lack of care … or making defamatory statements where it is 
foreseeable that others may overhear the conversation”32 
Rather than being a critique of the author, these quotations explain how the criteria for 
establishing a defamation claim have been dulled over time. The hallmark of strict liability is that 
the focus is on the act (or omission to act) leading to damage. There is no consideration of 
intention. A classic example has been the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.33 In that case, the plaintiff 
established the defendant’s liability for damage to his property by the defendant (in fact 
contractors working for the defendant) bringing a dangerous substance onto his property. This 
was a non-natural use of the land leading to a dangerous substance escaping the defendant’s 
property and causing the damage in question. Over time, the English courts modified this tort by 
adding an element of foreseeability. As one example, Lord Bingham in Transco plc v. Stockport 
MBC34 phrased the addition as follows: “It must be shown that the defendant has done something 
which he recognised, or judged by the standards appropriate at the relevant time and place, he 
ought reasonably to have recognised, as giving rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger or 
mischief if there should be an escape, however unlikely an escape may have been thought to be.”  
 
In the two strict liability quotations above, defamation contains an element of intention with 
regards to publication. The requirement, however, is understated and as such practically 
infrequently arises as an issue. The publication process emerges as a factor. Publication itself 
implies an intentional action. It is a term that suggests (at least) a process of editing and 
reconsideration of the words published: “A printer and publisher intends to publish, and so 
intending cannot plead as a justification that he did not know the contents.”35 Culpability, then, is 
29 Lord Chancellor, Hansard HL Deb 2 Apr 1996: Col 242.   
30 Ibid.  
31 Osborne 428. 
32 Ibid 433.  
33 (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
34 [2003] UKHL 61, [10].  
35 McLeod v St Aubyn [1899] AC 549, 562 (PC). 
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subsumed by the process: those involved knew or ought to have known that they were publishing 
these words. “[F]or a person to be held responsible there must be knowing involvement in the 
process of publication of the relevant words”. 36  The words themselves may not have been 
intended to defame; and still the words attract a strict liability approach which is confusingly 
undermined by the intention to publish. The innovation of internet-based communications 
technologies is that the process of publication is truncated. What before required a series of 
individuals working together (from writing to publication), now requires only one person who 
serves each of those roles. This one person may publish any comment to an undetermined 
audience consisting of individuals with access to internet-based communications. This is an 
important consideration: should the presumption of intention in publication be maintained with 
information technology or should this be reconsidered given the truncated process between 
thought to publication?  
 
In assessing protection of reputation in the internet age, consideration of a negligence standard in 
defamation (whether it should be the standard or in effect this is the standard of analysis) will 
arise. The argument has been put forward by Eric Descheemaeker and, in Canada, Hilary Young. 
The contention is that in enlarging protection for free speech, the standard for liability has more 
closely approximated that of negligence (though statutory changes in 2013 suggest this too has 
been altered). Descheemaeker’s work in this area is particularly helpful in explicating the 
movement. 37  With the shift noted above, harming reputation remains wrongful, but what 
constitutes a challenge to that reputation (or an opinion in relation to an individual’s reputation) 
has grown and as a result the scope for impairment has diminished. A caution is noted here with 
regards to a (more overt) negligence standard for defamation. Further development along this 
line may stunt the growth of reputation claims because it will be a procedural assessment instead 
of a balancing of competing interests. It may be queried whether there is a way to factor dignity 
into negligence claims.38 
 
(ii) A tort with public importance 
Aside from the strict liability issue, a question has long lingered as to what is the objective of this 
tort of libel. It has been written that “[i]n defamation … the defendant commits the wrong by 
making statements about the plaintiff to people other than the plaintiff.”39 This is not the most 
precise rendering. The ‘wrong’ is not simply making statements about the plaintiff to others. It is 
publishing what are considered to be defamatory statements to others. Nevertheless, there has 
been a legitimate argument of a disconnect in calling speech (free speech being a cherished right 
in a liberal democracy) a wrong. It should be noted that there has been movement at common 
law to address this argument.  
 
A starting point is to look at the more recent emphasis in defamation law (notably libel) on 
protection of a wider range of speech. The ascendant view is that speech, in its multifarious 
forms, must be protected but some level of guardianship over reputation should be noted. 
Different sources are cited to underpin the importance of speech, such as: The Universal 
36 Tamiz v Google Inc. [2013] EWCA Civ 68, [23]. 
37 For example, Eric Descheemaeker, “Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence” (2009) 29 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 603-641: “the fact of the matter is that it is less and less true that defamation is not 
negligence-based.” The Defamation Act 2013, s.4 may limit this idea. 
38 The difficulty is increased if one is to consider defamation through corrective justice as the Supreme Court of 
Canada suggested negligence is supposed to be in Clements v Clements 2012 SCC 32, [21], [37]:  “the theory …that 
underlies the law of negligence” and as the “anchor” of negligence. 
39 Ripstein, 189. Ripstein identifies his ill-ease with the definition. 
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Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the importance of free speech in its preamble; it is also 
recognized in Art.19 of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.40 The late 
Professor Weir’s trenchant criticisms in the early years of the 21st century expressed unabated 
disdain for defamation law as a “blot on the lawscape” 41 because it accorded protection to 
reputation similar in strength as protection of liberty, a “surely more important value”.42 Even at 
that time, the tort was under significant change; to the point that now a view of defamation as an 
action that fits with other torts by compensating for harm has become more difficult to reconcile. 
As the end of the 20th century was in view, the House of Lords in AG v Guardian Newspapers 
Ltd (No.2)43 established that interference with freedom of expression should only be undertaken 
where there was a pressing social need. Mullis and Scott cited this case as one of the first 
representing a “rebalancing of the law”.44 To this we may add Lord Nicholls’ words in Reynolds: 
“To be justified, any curtailment of freedom of expression must be convincingly established by a 
compelling countervailing consideration, and the means employed must be proportionate to the 
end sought to be achieved.”45 Arguments regarding safeguarding plurality and democratic values 
are readily recognizable.46 In Chase v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd., the English Court of Appeal, 
synthesizing decisions from the European Court of Human Rights,47 determined why free speech 
remains pivotal:  
(1) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and 
the safeguards to be afforded to the press are of particular importance. 
(2) Not only does the press, playing its vital role of "public watchdog", have the task of imparting 
information and ideas of public interest or serious public concern, but the public also has a right to 
receive them. 
(3) The test of "necessity in a democratic society" requires the court to determine whether the 
"interference" complained of corresponds to a "pressing social need", whether it is proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued, and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it 
are relevant and sufficient. 
(4) Notwithstanding the essential function the press fulfils in a democratic society, it must not 
overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others.48 
Professor Cane wrote that we recompense when “some other person can be said to be responsible 
for that harm in one of the senses of ‘responsible’ recognized by tort law in its heads of 
liability.” 49  Professor Ripstein contends that defamation law, as a tort, “is a system of 
responsibility in the sense that its basic doctrines are expressions of an idea that human beings 
are responsible agents to whom particular acts can be attributed.”50 Amending this rendering, 
defamation (notably libel) has been tempered as a tort of responsibility by concerns regarding 
40 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. 
41 Tony Weir, An Introduction to the Law of Tort 2nd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2006) [Weir], 190. Slightly more charitable, 
William Prosser, in The Handbook of the Law of Torts (St Paul: West, 1941), 778, stated: “there is a great deal of the 
law of defamation which makes no sense.” 
42 Ibid 176. Plural in original. 
43 [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (HL) (often referred to as the Spycatcher case). 
44 Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “The swing of the pendulum: reputation, expression and the re-centring English 
libel law” (2012) 63 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 27-58 [Mullis & Scott], 29.  
45 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd. [1999] 3 WL.R. 1010 [Reynolds], 1022. 
46 See for example the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Steel and Morris v UK (2005), 41 
E.H.R.R. 22, [87] where the court wrote of free speech: it is “one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment”.   
47 Jersild v Denmark (1994), 19 E.H.R.R. 26, [31]; Stemsaas v Norway (1999), 29 E.H.R.R. 125, [58]-[59]. 
48 [2002] EWCA 1772, [60]. 
49 Peter Cane, “Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law” in Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton eds The 
Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998), 141-173 [Cane], 141. 
50 Ripstein 191. 
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free speech. Libel has become less about assigning responsibility and more about tending a gate 
through which speech passes. The importance of speech in a democracy influences the structure 
of this private law tort. Twenty-first century libel law has emphasized protection of speech.  
 
This is all before we even consider the nature of the defences. The ‘wrong’ may be permitted 
where the libel defences may apply; suggesting a vital role for them in this tort.51 The defences 
range in their objectives:52 from protecting truth (justification) to preserving space for value 
judgments (fair comment).53 The more recent development of the responsible communication 
defence on matters of public interest, developed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Grant v 
Torstar, moved Canada more into line with libel law defences in Australia, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. For those who followed developments in UK libel cases between Reynolds v 
Times Newspapers Ltd54 and Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No.3)55, the non-
exhaustive criteria in Grant for this defence56 gives rise to foreseeable concerned commentary.57 
Foremost, there is a strong possibility of lower courts employing the criteria exhaustively 
(despite the Supreme Court’s final point being “any other relevant circumstances”). In the UK, 
lower courts did just this and it took the House of Lords in Jameel to disabuse the lower courts of 
this technical application. These decisions and the criticism thereof underscore the inextricable 
nature of the claim and defences in libel adjudication. And so, there must be an understanding of 
this tort which links the elements of the cause of action with the defences because these defences 
stand out as unique aspects peculiar to this tort.  
 
It is not suggested that reputation has been devalued in defamation. Rather, this is how libel is an 
action within a juridical process. Reputation includes an individual’s good name as well as her 
economic interests. The law recognizes that both58 may be diminished by defamatory remarks. 
Reputation remains difficult to firmly define. A complicating factor for this study, it is 
influenced by the society (sometimes it may seem that reputation is adjudicated in a manner 
which seems closer to a perception of society). The absence of controlled factors renders the 
concept subjective and therefore difficult to assess in absolute terms. The difficulties experienced 
by the law with regards to this term may be attributable to the ‘relatively recent’ development of 
defamation law as a means of protecting reputation. 59 Legal conceptions of reputation are 
51 David Mangan, “Social media in the workplace” in David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies (eds) The Legal 
Challenges of Social Media (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017). 
52 Eric Descheemaeker has aptly characterised defamation defences as ‘reclaiming much – if not most – of the 
“territory” that the first part of the enquiry [satisfying the tripartite criteria] had handed to the pursuing party’: Eric 
Descheemaeker “Mapping Defamation Defences” (2015), 78 Modern Law Review 641.   
53 The widening of the defence more recently to an opinion being one that “anyone could honestly have expressed”: 
WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson 2008 SCC 40, [26]; Grant v Torstar 2009 SCC 61, [31]. 
54 [1999] UKHL 45. 
55 [2006] UKHL 44. 
56 Grant [126]. 
57 Hilary Young has suggested this is happening: Hilary Young, “‘Anyone … in any medium’? The scope of 
Canada’s responsible communication defense’ in Andrew T. Kenyon (ed) Comparative Defamation and Privacy 
Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2016)17-39. 
58 Eric Descheemaeker makes this point in his discussion of claims in negligence and defamation as considered in 
the well-known case of Spring v Guardian Assurance [1994] 3 All ER 129: Eric Descheemaeker, The Division of 
Wrongs (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 250. 
59 Lawrence McNamara noted the development in the law of defamation from ‘a strategy for maintaining the social 
order, the spiritual order, or the public peace’ ‘to protection of reputation’ as ‘a very real and meaningful 
justification for the law today’: Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 
[McNamara], 94, 102, 108. 
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protected; that is, safeguards are restricted to “a certain class of acts”.60 Still, it cannot be said 
that libel precludes anyone from challenging reputation. This is the less defined area of 
defamation which highlights the tension between protecting reputation and ensuring free speech. 
People are entitled to hold opinions and to express them. These opinions may be rude, unkind 
and even inappropriate. And yet, they may not be actionable by way of defamation. Defamation, 
then, is not necessarily the personal tort about reputation it may appear to be. A dual function for 
libel may be more readily discerned that balances protection of reputation as well as a spectrum 
for free speech. This dual function may be best represented in the defences to a defamation 
action: speech may be found to be defamatory and still not be the subject of legal sanction 
because robust defences have been put in place so that speech is protected.  
  
The defences are a testament to the importance placed on free speech.61 For example, qualified 
privilege “applies even if the statements are untrue.”62 This is an important aspect of the defence 
because defamation has often been discussed as a matter of truth and falsehood. Understandably 
this arises as a result of the defence of justification which provides a full defence if the impugned 
remark is truthful.  
 
An arguably larger portion of comments consist of opinions; assessments of individuals based 
upon inferences drawn from points in the public domain.63 Opinions are subject to their own 
defence, namely fair comment (now honest opinion in the UK).64 In explicating the defence of 
fair comment, Professor Ripstein contrasts the Canadian decision of Vander Zalm v Times 
Publishers65 with the UK decision in British Chiropractic Association v Singh.66 The comparison 
serves a purpose here as well. In the Canadian decision, the plaintiff had been the subject of a 
political cartoon in the defendant publication (he was depicted picking the wings off flies). 
Overturning the trial decision, the Court of Appeal determined the claim67 failed because there 
was no depiction of an actual offence.68 The matter was not so simple in the UK case.  
 
60 Ripstein 192. 
61 In Canadian tort textbooks, there had been a muted discussion of the importance of the defences. Solomon et al 
(1075) note: “The defences signal that, in some situations, the value of free and uninhibited speech outweighs the 
need to protect a person’s reputation.” 
62 Solomon et al 1104. 
63 Often referred to as facts, but this nomenclature can be misleading because these may not be facts in the sense of 
truth and falsehood. Rather these are statements in the public domain upon which opinions may be formed; that is, 
they are predicated upon remarks found elsewhere. 
64 Defamation Act, 2013, s.3. 
65 (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 531 (BCCA). 
66 [2010] EWCA Civ 350 [Singh]. The case is discussed in David Mangan, “An Argument for the Common Law 
Defence of Honest Comment” (2011), 16 Communications Law 140. 
67 Vander Zalm claiming the cartoon depicted him as "a person of cruel and sadistic nature who enjoys inflicting 
suffering and torture on helpless beings who cannot protect themselves".  
68 Of the opinions rendered, that of Atkins J.A. [82] best encapsulates the matter in relation to the aims of this study: 
“The reasonable man of ordinary intelligence would clearly understand that political cartoons are rhetorical in the 
sense that the cartoonist makes his point indirectly by the use of symbolism, allegory, or satire and, I would add, 
exaggeration. The trial judge, having correctly concluded that the cartoon should be and would be considered 
symbolically, allegorically or satirically, then found that the cartoon's "natural and ordinary meaning", as understood 
by viewers, was that the plaintiff was "a person of a cruel and sadistic nature who enjoys inflicting suffering on 
helpless persons". No doubt, in doing so, the trial judge considered the meaning symbolically, allegorically or 
satirically. My difficulty with the finding is that the meaning found is in fact, in my respectful view, too close to the 
literal meaning that would be taken by a viewer who did not take into account the symbolism, allegory or satire and 
usual exaggeration to be found in cartoons, or the consideration that it was a political cartoon.” 
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The defendant in Singh was not the publishing newspaper (The Guardian) but the author of the 
article in question. To situate the case, it is worth noting the defendant’s prominence. Simon 
Singh MBE is a known author and journalist specialising in science and mathematics. He 
obtained his doctorate in particle physics from Cambridge University. The contested article was 
published in the The Guardian of April 19, 2008 and contained the following statement: “The 
British Chiropractic Association [BCA] claims that their members can help treat children with 
colic, sleeping and feeding problems, frequent ear infections, asthma and prolonged crying. Even 
though there is not a jot of evidence. This organisation is the respectable face of the chiropractic 
profession and yet it happily promotes bogus treatments.” 69  Singh adopted the study of 
chiropractic by his co-author (Edzard Ernst) in a text of alternative medicines in support of his 
comments.70 The BCA claimed that the article was defamatory because it alleged the Association 
was not a legitimate collection of medical professionals and, instead, was fraudulently taking 
money for worthless treatments.  Eady J. heard the case at first instance. Finding for the BCA, he 
ruled that Singh's words would mean the following to a reasonable reader: (a) that the BCA 
claimed that chiropractic was effective in helping to treat a variety of ailments, although it knew 
that there was absolutely no evidence to support its claims; (b) that by making those claims the 
BCA knowingly promoted ‘bogus’ treatments; and (c) that Singh's remarks were ‘factual 
assertions rather than the mere expression of opinion.’71 The phrases ‘not a jot of evidence’ and 
‘happily promoted bogus remedies’ appeared to be statements of fact. The Court of Appeal 
overturned the trial decision.  
 
The composition of the bench (comprised of the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and 
Lord Justice Sedley) intimated the Court of Appeal wished to provide an unequivocal statement 
about defamation in this decision. Lord Chief Justice Judge, for the court, wrote: “The material 
words, however one represented or paraphrased their meaning, were expressions of opinion. The 
opinion might be mistaken, but to allow the party which had been denounced on the basis of it to 
compel its author to prove in court what he had asserted by way of argument was to invite the 
court to become an Orwellian ministry of truth.”72 Curiously, the decision glossed over points 
that would have been worthy of consideration, such as the BCA “happily promot[ing] bogus 
remedies”.  For the Court of Appeal, honest comment protected speech which challenged the 
standing of a collective of individuals in matters of public interest, even if it consisted of a 
denunciation. The tone of Singh suggested the Court of Appeal intended to speak most 
particularly to the critics of English defamation law. Singh offered readers a value 
judgment73  and this opinion was found worthy of the protection afforded by the defence. It 
remained unclear how the court differentiated between facts and opinions; 74   though value 
judgment provided the means by which the distinction was made. Part of the reflection on value 
judgments insisted that courts were to remain outside of debates in the nature of scientific 
controversies. The legal considerations extended beyond the scientific, however, and could well 
have included the extent of Singh's disparagement of the BCA. After all, Singh was challenging 
69 Singh [1]. 
70 Ibid [28]. 
71 [2009] EWHC 1101 (QB), [14]. 
72 Singh [23]. 
73 ‘If in the course of the debate the view is expressed that there is not a jot of evidence for one deduction or another, 
the natural meaning is that there is no worthwhile or reliable evidence for it. That is as much a value judgment as a 
contrary viewpoint would be’: Singh, [26]. 
74 Eric Barendt, “Science Commentary and the Defence of Honest comment to Libel Proceedings” (2010), 2 Journal 
of Media Law 43, 47. 
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not just the science behind chiropractic but also suggesting the BCA and its members may well 
have been engaged in unsavoury (if not criminal) conduct.75 
 
Libel, then, is even a challenging subject within its home of tort. It raises questions regarding the 
value placed on free speech. Additionally, it compels consideration of the foundation of tort law. 
Tort has been dissected in differing ways, but most often it has been understood as assigning 
responsibility for a wrong. In libel, the wrong is speech and this surface level contradiction 
presents remarkable difficulties for consistency: how can speech be viewed as a wrong (given the 
importance placed on it within a democracy)? The question casually alludes to the influence of 
the American decision of Sullivan. And yet, there remains an importance to understanding that 
the present exercise is one of looking at defamation in Canada, specifically Ontario. For, in 
Canada, the Charter governs rights and freedoms (whether they are public sector matters or 
having a level of consistency with Charter values in the private sector76) and s.1 of the Charter, 
paraphrasing, states that there are rights and freedoms outlined herein, but they are subject to 
limitation in accordance with a democratic society. As a result, the Charter encapsulates the 
rights as well as the correlating responsibilities of individuals. The starting point is to recognize 
there is a limitation which has been deemed acceptable. To this is added the understanding that 
the Charter penetrates these private instances: “Charter values, framed in general terms, should 
be weighed against the principles which underlie the common law. The Charter values will then 
provide the guidelines for any modification to the common law which the court feels is 
necessary”.77 Balancing Charter values with changing times as they pertain to the common law, 
the court’s role was explained by Chief Justice McLachlin as follows: “It is implicit in this duty 
that the courts will, from time to time, take a fresh look at the common law and re-evaluate its 
consistency with evolving societal expectations through the lens of Charter values.”78 
 
(iii) The influence of information technology on libel 
Synthesizing these points, the combination of the development of defamation law and 
innovations in internet communication, participation in discourse has come to the forefront. The 
influence of internet-based communication developments on reputation matters (and more 
generally on speech) has been the crystallization of a dialogical format. What this means is that 
news has long been reported (and commented upon) by what are now viewed as traditional news 
media and this format was one-way: media to audience. Free speech was largely dominated by 
the notion of a free press. With internet-based forms of communication, the capacity for the 
individual to participate in free speech has greatly advanced, resulting in a more individualized 
demonstration of free speech that encourages discourse. User-generated content on the internet 
would seem to only further imperil reputation.79 And yet, free speech would seem to necessarily 
mean that individuals (utilizing information technology platforms) as well as news media are 
both granted free speech rights that are subject to limitation.  
75 On this point it is worth noting the decision in Robins v Kordowski [2011] EWHC 1912, [31] where the defendant 
asserted a defence of honest comment which was denied by the court because the remarks - that the claimant was a 
liar and unscrupulous - were statements of fact. 
76 “Charter values, framed in general terms, should be weighed against the principles which underlie the common 
law. The Charter values will then provide the guidelines for any modification to the common law which the court 
feels is necessary”: Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, [97].  
77 Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, [97]. 
78 Grant v Torstar 2009 SCC 61, [46]. 
79 Danah Boyd’s term ‘persistent’ embodies the challenges here: Danah Boyd, ‘Social Network Sites as Networked 
Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications’ in Zizi Papacharissi (ed) Networked Self: Identity, Community, 
and Culture on Social Network Sites (New York: Routledge, 2011) 39-58. 
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The effect of information technology granting individuals the capacity for expression is that it 
broadens what is meant by free speech. Defamation cases have primarily been between public 
figures (of some form) and news media companies. The latter often arguing in favour of freedom 
of speech. Since much of the litigation was taken by this litigant, the arguments were steeped in 
democratic underpinnings. Social media platforms, as one example of internet-based 
communication technology, 80  have now vaulted the individual into a novel dimension that 
challenges the domain held by traditional news agencies. As noted by the European Court of 
Human Rights, the internet “has now become one of the principal means by which individuals 
exercise their right to freedom of expression and information, providing as it does essential tools 
for participation in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of general 
interest.”81 
 
As a result of internet communication capabilities, a disconnect between the legal and lay 
understandings of these media has emerged. Taking social media platforms as a subset of 
internet communications, the belief that social media is ‘only’ another medium for oral 
discussion remains ubiquitous amongst a non-legal audience. In Pridgen v University of 
Calgary82 one of the claimants offered the following understanding of Facebook: “… it’s a social 
networking site, things that are said on here are not designed to be held up to intense scrutiny, it 
is merely the equivalent of having an online conversation. It is as public as … standing in the 
middle of the University … hallway and saying the exact same thing”.83 The perception of the 
medium 84 does not fit with long-held distinctions in the law regarding liberties attached to 
speech. 85  Disconnect between users’ perceptions of the role of the medium and legal 
distinctions86 adds to this complicated topic and also confirms the impact of the distinction 
between slander and libel87 where, for the most part, the latter has been actionable per se.88 The 
intrigue between the legal and lay understanding of the actionability of written statements is that 
it recalls Professor Mitchell’s passing note that the court in Thorley may have “felt free to take a 
more critical, principled line” had it been aware of the weak foundation of the law at that time.89 
This is intriguing because the widespread use of internet communications may provide an 
80 An overview of this topic can be found in Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society 3rd 
ed (Oxford: OUP, 2016), Chapter 8. 
81 Yildirim v Turkey [2012] ECHR 2074, [56]. 
82 2012 ABCA 139.   
83 Ibid [32]. 
84 Voorhoof and Humblet have called this a “virtual conflict zone”: Dick Voorhoof and Patrick Humblet, “The Right 
to Freedom of Expression in the Workplace under Article 10 ECHR” in Filip Dorssemont, Klaus Lörcher and 
Isabelle Schömann (eds), The European Convention on Human Right and the Employment Relation (Hart 2013) 238. 
85 The argument that Twitter comments are akin to a private conversation was expressly rejected by a Canadian 
labour tribunal in Toronto Professional Firefighters Association, Local 3888 v Grievance of Edwards, F13-142-07, 
2014 CanLII 62879, [178]. 
86 The employer’s successful argument in Canada Post Corp v Canadian Union of Postal Workers [2012] CLAD 
No 85 [82] is of note: “The Employer suggested that there is a fundamental difference between “bar talk” and social 
media: social media is accessible for months or years; it has a huge potential audience; the contents are discoverable 
through key word searches, and the contents are easily copied and forwarded to others”. 
87 Note legislative exceptions in the UK: Defamation Act 1952, s 16(1) words shall be construed as including a 
reference to pictures, visual images, gestures and other methods of signifying meaning’ and its extension under the 
Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984, s 28; as well as the Theatres Act 1968, s 4(1). Similar provisions are found in 
Ontario such as the Libel and Slander Act R.S.O. 1990, c.L.12, s.1(2) 
88 With s.1 of the UK Defamation Act 2013 (a claim must meet a threshold of serious harm), this statement has 
become equivocal.   
89 Mitchell 9. 
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opportunity to rethink accepted distinctions.90 In comparison to the various internet-based means 
of communication, the spoken word now reaches a smaller audience. The reach of the social 
media platforms (for example) makes it difficult to separate damage from the vastness of the 
audience; for this must be considered an aspect of the harm.   
 
Internet communications have demonstrated two related points about this long-held 
understanding of defamation. First, writing itself does not necessarily embody premeditation. 
Individuals may write just as ‘unthinkingly’ as they may speak. Second, the permanent form of 
writing was more a reference to a process of intention. It may be viewed as the process of 
publication which entails editing and refining (if not also reconsidering) what has been written. 
Implying this process, the permanence of the form imbued the act of publication with the 
intention to inflict harm on the subject’s reputation. As compared to slander, the permanent form 
of libel was interpreted as evidencing intentional conduct that carried greater possibility for harm 
to reputation. The concern has been potential for injury and opinions differed (Chief Justice 
Mansfield’s statements in Thorley being one example) as to which medium (spoken or written 
word) reached the larger audience. The various internet communication technologies permit a 
similar kind of unthinking publication as had been associated with slander; a version of speaking 
without thinking, but in a published form. These technologies also bring into question the 
intention behind publication: does the individual intend to disparage the subject’s reputation or 
are they commenting in an imprudent, emotional manner? Overall, the premeditated, calculated 
action to injure reputation becomes a more nuanced consideration once internet-based forms of 
communication are included. To this it must be added that the spectrum of harm remains difficult 
to define; reminiscent of defining reputation. Hate speech would be a classic example of harmful 
speech;91 that is, speech that would encourage physical harm to come to a class of persons. Hate 
speech may also lead to reputational harm insofar as being the subject of hate speech may 
equally cause those adopting the message of hate speech to shun the objects of the remarks. 
Beyond these examples, there is much contested ground as to what constitutes crossing a 
threshold of harming an individual’s reputation.  
 
It is anticipated that discussions will increasingly consider what has been called “cyberspace 
liberum”.92 With regards to free speech, the issue is of one of extraterritoriality. Perhaps the most 
pertinent example is the French Court decision of 2000 in LICRA and UEJF v Yahoo! Inc and 
Yahoo France93where the court ordered Yahoo! to block access to an auction on its site where 
Nazi paraphernalia was being sold (such a sale being a criminal offence in France). The order 
has met with praise (as respecting national democracies) and criticism (such a precedent being 
open to undemocratic government actions).94 Unlike Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum,95 cyberspace 
90 Defamation law appears to be one area in which some concepts were decided long ago, despite more recent 
criticisms. The single publication rule was set out in the 19th century and by Charleston v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65, 71 was ‘too well established to require citation of authority’. And yet, consider the arguments 
against the rule in Andrew Scott, ‘Ceci n'est pas une pipe: the autopoietic inanity of the single meaning rule’ in 
Andrew T Kenyon (ed), Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (CUP, 2016). 
91 Eric Heinze has recently critically engaged with hate speech in Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (OUP 
2016). 
92 Mireille Hildebrandt, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyberspace? Bodin, Schmitt and Grotius in 
Cyberspace” (2013), 65 University of Toronto Law Journal 163. 
93  Order of November 20, 2000 by the Superior Court of Paris.  
94 Hildebrandt 218. 
95 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Sea (1668), translated and revised by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1960) 
 15 
                                                 
does not have the natural boundaries of land as found in the law of the sea. While there are 
clearer points to be made about cyberspace and commerce,96 the pernicious challenge remains 
the democratic nature of free speech extraterritorially. The Law Commission’s project is situated 
within this more difficult space. 
 
Finally, the legal avenues for protection of reputation are at the heart of this discussion. The 
“vital importance” of reputation stems from it being the "fundamental foundation on which 
people are able to interact with each other in social environments".97 The crux of the difficulty in 
answering the question ‘what is the point of libel law?’ is set within the law’s mandate to balance 
these competing interests. The age of the internet has in fact intensified the challenges posed to 
reputational concerns. Mister Justice Binnie identified reputation as the “regrettable but 
unavoidable road kill on the highway of public controversy”98 remains poignant given these new 
capacities. And still, this battered notion remains one of such importance that it warrants 
protection. Consider Lord Nicholls’ remark in Reynolds that “[p]rotection of reputation is 
conducive to the public good”.99 
 
Complicating this topic is the fact that reputation is a difficult term to define. A reputation stands 
out as simultaneously a personal matter and one of public input. Using the analogy of an 
individual’s Facebook profile, a reputation may be constructed to convey a certain character. 
However, reputation, like the profile page, does not exist in isolation as others may add their own 
assessments. Professor Ripstein argues “against the balancing picture, suggesting instead that the 
law of defamation serves to protect each person’s entitlement that no other person determines his 
or her standing in the eyes of others”.100 Reputation certainly includes a personal entitlement. 
Still, the concept of a reputation seems to be more of a dialectic between the individual and the 
community (immediate or broader, depending on the individual). There is indeed a relativity to a 
reputation which can be used to undercut the need for its protection: if it is so ethereal why 
should it be protected at the ‘expense’ of free speech. Professor Howarth’s response seems apt in 
this instance: 
The content of reputations might well change as social and cultural conditions change, but that does 
not alter the fact that, at every moment throughout those changes, individuals have reputations the loss 
of which would do them harm. Even if individuals have no legitimate expectations that social and 
cultural conditions will remain unchanged, they do have a legitimate interest in the maintenance of 
their reputations for the time being.101 
Overall, there is an importance to protection of reputation that has been recognized at the highest 
level of English courts:  
 Reputation is an integral and important part of the dignity of the individual. It also forms the basis of 
many decisions in a democratic society which are fundamental to its well-being: whom to employ or 
work for, whom to promote, whom to do business with or to vote for. Once besmirched by an 
unfounded allegation in a national newspaper, a reputation can be damaged for ever, especially if 
there is no opportunity to vindicate one's reputation. When this happens, society as well as the 
individual is the loser. For it should not be supposed that protection of reputation is a matter of 
importance only to the affected individual and his family. Protection of reputation is conducive to the 
public good. It is in the public interest that the reputation of public figures should not be debased 
96 Hildebrandt 223. 
97 Hill 160, 162-163. 
98 WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, [2]. 
99 Reynolds, 201.   
100 Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs, (HUP: Boston, 2016), 188.  
101 David Howarth, ‘Libel: Its purpose and reform’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 845, 849. Reference should also 
be made to Lord Nicholls’ remark in Reynolds that ‘Protection of reputation is conducive to the public good’: 
Reynolds, 201.   
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falsely. In the political field, in order to make an informed choice, the electorate needs to be able to 
identify the good as well as the bad. Consistently with these considerations, human rights conventions 
recognise that freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Its exercise may be subject to such 
restrictions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
reputations of others.102 
Brought together, reputation is a matter of personal entitlement that has historically been 
expressed in law through the tort of defamation. Contemporaneous with this tort have been the 
fluctuations of social and cultural influences. While the law does not render a reputation 
impregnable from those influences, it does provide for redress so that individuals may take steps 
to protect the legitimate interest they have in a good reputation. In a word, dignity103 (of the 
person) is an essential aim of protection of reputation. It is noteworthy then that the importance 
of reputation was recognized in the U.S. even after Sullivan. Stewart J in Rosenblatt v. Baer104 
stated: “The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and 
wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every 
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”  
 
IV. Forms of expression on the internet similar to or contrasting with defamatory speech 
The internet has augmented the means by which expression (speech) may be made. Guidance is 
taken from the Commission’s focus on defamation law as a private law tort. This section points out 
that with information technology, there are now different means of expression beyond words or 
photos. For example, social media has introduced the concepts of ‘liking’ or ‘re-tweeting’ (even 
emojis) as means of expression. (To some they may be similar to the concept of re-publication in 
defamation. And yet, they also add an element of approval that may be absent in re-publication.) The 
different forms of expression inform the substantive discussions that follow. The objective of this 
section is to note the expanding means for expression precipitated by information technology.   
 
It remains unclear if this issue may have been addressed through previous Canadian jurisprudence. 
Redress in these scenarios may be within the tort of defamation, but the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Crookes v Newton105 (where the court ruled that hyperlinks in an article did not constitute 
publication in itself) raises a question regarding the extent of re-publication. The acts of liking, re-
tweeting or employing an emoji can be understood as forms of expression that are positive acts, 
distinguishable from hyperlinks insofar as they are forms of expression.106   
 
There is a distinction to be made in this discussion. There are forms of expression via the internet 
which would fall outside of the private law aspects denoted by defamation. These may broadly be 
classified as part of the public law domain of criminal or quasi-criminal law. For example, a term 
that has developed through notorious circumstances is ‘cyberbullying’. It is defined broadly to 
include any electronic communication that would reasonably be expected “to cause fear, 
intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another person’s health, emotional 
102 Reynolds 201; also cited in Richard Parkes QC, “Privacy, Defamation, and False Facts” in N.A. Moreham and Sir 
Mark Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford: OUP, 2016), [8.13].  
103 This is the third of three ways in which reputation was understood by Robert Post: Robert Post, “The Social 
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution” (1986) 74 California Law Review 691. This work 
is used as a tool for elaboration and so the many authors who have offered critical commentary on this piece (such as 
Howarth) will not be explored here. 
104 (1966) 383 US 75, 92. 
105 2011 SCC 47. 
106 It is understood that of these forms of communication, re-tweeting may be the closest to reproducing a hyperlink 
(following Crookes) and so there may be distinctions made within the forms of expression denoted here.  
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well-being, self-esteem or reputation.”107 Nova Scotia developed specific legislation, the Cyber-
safety Act. It has subsequently been called into question through a constitutional challenge.108 
Where there are relevant points, this area and others like it are discussed in a manner strictly 
limited to the regulatory lessons to be drawn.  
 
V. Reputation and privacy 
The intersection between privacy and reputation was identified some time ago by Cory J in Hill v 
Church of Scientology of Toronto: “reputation is intimately related to the right to privacy which 
has been accorded constitutional protection.”109 As noted in the Overview section above, there 
are different layers to this study; namely, privacy, the intersection between defamation and 
privacy; data protection. The starting point will be privacy because it is viewed as an umbrella 
term that will be dissected into subsets; for these distinctions are important in meeting the aims 
of the Commission’s mandate.  
 
(i) Limitations of defamation 
There are two premises for the argument here that defamation is a tort of limited utility in the age 
of the internet.  
 
First, free speech should be protected for both the free press as well as the individual expressing 
herself online. This is not to suggest the two are necessarily the same. Rather, the argument is 
that information technology has provided the unprecedented potential for one person to speak to 
anyone who has internet access. The freedom to do so should be protected, but like a free press, 
should not be unfettered. As a result, the strengthened defences of this tort should also be 
available to the individual. Second, defamation is a tort that protects reputation in the 
circumstances of an individual making a defamatory statement. However, it does not guarantee 
redress where an individual (for example) releases information that the subject has tried to keep 
private. It may be said this information should come out. While this may be true in certain 
circumstances, it should not be true in every circumstance; that is, there should be a means for 
reparation when appropriate. 
 
With regards to free speech for the individual with a (for example) social media platform, free 
speech may be identified as containing the individual good of self-development. Free press has 
been the more dominant focus of endorsement. This may not quite be understood as the same as 
free speech insofar as the latter term alludes to the individual right and the former a more 
particular form of the right. This distinction seems crucial for the law’s application to the broad 
forms of internet communication under contemplation. Information technology invigorates the 
idea of free speech insofar as the individual possesses a platform for expression. However, if free 
speech is viewed as a free press, then the role and influence of information technology may be 
significantly truncated. In the tort of defamation, there is an imprint of the importance of free 
speech. This tort operates in a unique manner insofar as the defences to a claim are of great 
importance to the action: speech may be found to be defamatory and still not be the subject of 
legal sanction because robust defences signify that speech should (generally) be protected. 
Defamation defences should also apply to individuals, but the matter is currently unclear.110  
107 Cyber-safety Act S.N.S. 2013, c. 2, s.3(1)(b). 
108 Crouch v Snell 2015 NSSC 340. 
109 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, [121]. 
110 In Seaga v Harper [2008] UKPC 9, [11], Lord Caswell for the Privy Council wrote: “whether 
the Reynolds defence is available only to the press and broadcasting media, or whether it is of wider ambit. 
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Second, defamation is viewed as a tort of limitation because of the key question posed in 
establishing a claim: Would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society generally? This is the often-cited phrase from Lord Atkin’s 
judgment in Sim v Stretch.111 (A more contemporary version may be the “reasonable, thoughtful 
and informed reader”.)112 Defamation has been the tort for those seeking redress for alleged harm 
to reputation. Words may indeed prompt right-thinking members of society to think less of an 
individual, but these remarks are not automatically defamatory. Information about an individual 
may be released and digested by (right-thinking) members of the public in a range of ways 
spanning the positive and the negative. While this information may be accurate, we may not wish 
for it to be released to the general public for the very reason that some may not view it 
favourably. And so, we take control over the information (to varying extents) we place in the 
public domain. Couple this attitude with developments in information technology through which 
information online is said to be: persistent; replicated; carries the potential to be viewed by an 
indeterminate audience; and can be accessed through search functions. 113  Mister Justice La 
Forest in R. v Dyment anticipated this discussion: “In modern society, especially, retention of 
information about oneself is extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be 
compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound where the reasonable expectations of 
the individual that the information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and restricted 
to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected.”114 To the individual seeking to keep 
certain information to herself, the internet has emerged as a pernicious challenge. According to a 
2012 Pew Research Center study of US residents, 44% of survey participants using social media 
have deleted comments made by others on their profile and 37% have removed their names from 
photos that were tagged to identify them.115 These numbers reflect how information about us 
posted by others has developed into a concern. The associated care taken directly relates to how 
we protect our reputation.  
 
To illustrate, consider The Intimate Image Protection Act.116 This Act came into force in January 
2016. Directly linked with the capacities provided by the internet to share information, it creates 
a tort of non-consensual distribution of intimate images. This tort is actionable per se and arises 
when a “person who distributes an intimate image of another person knowing that the person 
depicted in the image did not consent to the distribution, or being reckless as to whether or not 
that person consented to the distribution, commits a tort against that other person.” The Act is a 
legislative response to the sordid phenomenon of revenge porn. In itself, these images would not 
ground a claim of defamation.117 And yet, recalling the measurement long ago set down, the 
In Kearns v General Council of the Bar [2003] EWCA Civ 331, the Court of Appeal expressed the view that it was 
confined to media publications. That was not, however, necessary to the decision and their Lordships are unable to 
accept that it is correct in principle. They can see no valid reason why it should not extend to publications made by 
any person who publishes material of public interest in any medium, so long as the conditions framed by Lord 
Nicholls as being applicable to "responsible journalism" are satisfied.” 
111 [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237 (HL). See Solomon et al 1080; Linden & Feldthusen 793. 
112 Creative Salmon Company Ltd v Staniford 2009 BCCA 61, leave to appeal refused [2009] SCCA No.154. 
113 Danah Boyd, ‘Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications’ in Zizi 
Papacharissi (ed) Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture on Social Network Sites (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 39-58. 
114 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, [22]. 
115 Mary Madden, ‘Privacy management on social media sites’ 24 February 2012 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/02/24/privacy-management-on-social-media-sites/  
116 C.C.S.M. c. I87, s 11. 
117 Depending on who took the photo, there may be a claim in copyright.  
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unlimited availability on the internet of such would likely prompt some right-thinking members 
of society to think less of the target in those images. For this reason, we have seen the 
development of tort law surrounding privacy in conjunction with reputation issues.  
 
Defamation (as the most identifiable tort protecting reputation) and privacy have been gradually 
moving towards each other in the early 21st century.118 Instruction on this movement can be 
taken from English jurisprudence. The intersection informs developing parameters regarding 
content published online.119 The common form of online publication is made by (what might be 
called) mainstream media. Social media, however, is a form in which personal information may 
be disclosed to a public audience. The overlap between defamation and privacy is evident 
through the test for the developing English tort of misuse of personal information that juxtaposes 
free speech with privacy considerations: 
1) Does the claimant have a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in respect of the information in 
question? If yes, then:  
2) Does the claimant’s interest in maintaining their right to informational privacy outweigh the 
defendant’s interest in publishing the information in pursuit of their right to freedom of expression?120 
Lord Hoffmann further drew out the connection between privacy and defamation in describing 
this tort as a “cause of action … [which] focuses upon … the right to control the dissemination of 
information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people”.121 
While questions have arisen as to whether it is a tort,122 breach of confidence has been deemed to 
‘better encapsulate’ the action.123 In the context of the present work, the action in breach of 
confidence will be considered later.  
 
(ii) Truth and falsity 
The call for research proposals includes mention of “the nature of truth and falsity and their legal 
significance in distinguishing between the torts of defamation and breach of privacy, particularly 
in the context of internet communications”.   
 
Historically, defamation has been viewed as a tort protecting reputation from the publication of 
false statements but may also capture legitimate criticisms. 124  While the latter point is not 
(technically) within the remit of the tort, a cynical view has developed regarding how defamation 
118 A point attested to by Eady J. in Hunt v Times Newspapers Ltd. [2012] EWHC 1220, [13] as well as the 
comments of the editors of the 12th edition of Gatley: Alastair Mullis & Richard Parkes QC (eds) Gatley on Libel 
and Slander 12th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), vi, [22.1]. Though data on actions in these two areas 
remain incomplete: Judith Townend, “Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales” (2013) 
5 Journal of Media Law 31-44.  
119 Consider the following statement from Gavin Millar QC and Andrew Scott, Newsgathering: Law, Regulation and 
the Public Interest (OUP, 2016), [17.02]: “The influence of the law of defamation on what is published is perhaps 
less definitive than the rapidly developing law of confidentiality and privacy.” 
120 As stated in a number of cases: see for example Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22 and the extended discussion 
in ETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 439, [10]. This tort is the renamed an action for breach 
of confidence: Campbell [14]. Whether or not this tort is now separate from the equitable cause of action remains to 
be firmly established: Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311 (leave to appeal to the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court on the tort issue refused 23 July 2015). 
121 Campbell [51]. 
122 See Mosley v New Groups Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777, [184]. But see discussion under Breach of 
Confidence in Section (iv)(b) below.   
123 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [14]. 
124 Andrew Scott, Reform of Defamation Law in Northern Ireland: Recommendations to the Department of Finance 
(June 2016) [1.01].  
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is used. This cynicism recalls some of the questions that surround the aim of defamation.125 The 
definitional problems complicate the investigation of reputation. As with much private law in 
Canada, defamation law is influenced significantly by English law. The court in Parmiter v 
Coupland 126provided an early, expansive definition: “A publication, without justification or 
lawful excuse, which is calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule”. In the later decision of Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures 
Ltd., 127  Slesser L.J. expanded the Parmiter v Coupland definition: “not only is the matter 
defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by reason of some moral 
discredit on [the plaintiff's] part, but also if it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided 
and that without any moral discredit on [the plaintiff's] part. It is for that reason that persons who 
have been alleged to have been insane, or to be suffering from certain diseases, and other cases 
where no direct moral responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to be entitled to 
bring an action to protect their reputation and their honour.” The now classic statement regarding 
the aim of defamation is that of Lord Atkin in Sim v Stretch. 128  Lord Atkin critiqued the 
understanding to that point as expressed in Parmiter v Coupland. Finding this standard to be too 
narrow, he restated the assessment in the now familiar form: “would the words tend to lower the 
plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?” In 1975, the Faulks 
Committee recommended: “Defamation shall consist of the publication to a third party of matter 
which in all the circumstances would be likely to affect a person adversely in the estimation of 
reasonable people generally.”129 In what has become an influential decision, Tugendhat J. wrote 
in Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd:130 “It will be seen from this collection of definitions 
that words may be defamatory, even though they neither impute disgraceful conduct to the 
plaintiff nor any lack of skill or efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional 
activity, if they hold him up to contempt, scorn or ridicule or tend to exclude him from society. 
On the other hand, insults which do not diminish a man's standing among other people do not 
found an action for libel or slander. The exact borderline may often be difficult to define.”  
 
It is important to note that falsity is not part of this lineage of definitions. The question persists: 
why do we associate falsehood with defamation claims. Take as one example the 1974 Report of 
the UK Law Commission which wrote: “An action for defamation lies in respect of the 
publication of information which is untrue where the publication results in the lowering of the 
reputation of the plaintiff in the view of right-thinking members of society.”131 The measurement, 
instead, has been ensconced within the rubric of society: would other right-thinking members of 
society think less of the individual based upon the published remark. To some this may be an 
unhelpfully arbitrary guide. It is suggested the absence of a firm definition is consistent with the 
case-by-case approach of the common law. Nevertheless, truth remains a part of defamation, 
most clearly in the form of the defence of justification. With this defamation (libel) defence, 
125 Eric Barendt, (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 110-125; David Howarth, “Libel: Its purpose and reform” 
(2011) 74 Modern Law Review 845-877; Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Reframing libel: taking (all) rights 
seriously and where it leads” (2012) 63 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 5-25. 
126 (1840), 151 E.R. 340, 341-342. 
127 (1934), 50 T.L.R. 581, 587. 
128 [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237, 1240. 
129 Committee on Defamation (1975) (Cmnd 5909), [65]. It is worth noting that the 1977 Restatement of the Law 
(Second) Torts (§559) seemed to match the Faulks Committee’s statement: “A communication is defamatory if it 
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 
persons from associating or dealing with him.” 
130 [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), [28]. 
131 Working Paper No. 58, Breach of Confidence (London: HMSO, 1974), [65]. 
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there is an undertone of John Stuart Mill’s contention regarding the benefits of a range of 
perspectives being voiced in public.132  
 
Today publications have become more nuanced than the dichotomy of truth and falsehood 
because of the increase in publications of opinion. Opinion would be the publication of remarks 
that are intended to be a value judgment of a topic as culled from various statements or facts in 
the public domain (though opinions may also publish new facts upon which they draw 
judgement). Inference would be an operable term here. These opinions may challenge the 
target’s reputation. Opinions do not necessarily rely upon truth or falsehood, but rather 
underscore the common metaphor of the marketplace of ideas. Where these opinions are more 
likely to be attacked arises with claims that insufficient data were assessed133 or that there was 
disclosure of personal information (thereby constituting a breach of privacy in some form).134 
From a strategic perspective, there is also an opening for claims to protect reputation that plead 
both defamation and privacy. For example, the publication of an opinion may be defamatory, but 
even so, may also attract the protection of one of the defences. Remarks made that draw 
inferences from or analyse points in the public domain can fall outside of the parameters of a 
successful defamation action. As a result, there may be a question as to the sufficient factual 
basis for the opinion (notably within the fair comment defence). Plaintiffs may try to attack this 
point by arguing that the defendants failed to take into consideration further facts and so there 
was not a sufficient factual basis. 135 And so, this research is mindful of the long-standing 
ambiguity in the tort of defamation regarding reputation, coupled with efforts to protect 
reputational interests through other claims, notably privacy-based arguments.  
 
While defamation is connected with truth in a direct manner, privacy is not. While truth and 
defamation discussions precipitate citation of the free and democratic society, privacy instead looks 
to protect information that has been controlled in a manner so as to remove it from the public gaze. 
Even the truth, when confronted by a privacy claim, is not necessarily the trump that it can be in 
defamation. Here, there is an indication of what is to come: when seeking to protect reputation, 
defamation and privacy claims have different aims.  
 
(iii) Privacy as a concept in law 
With developments in information technology, freedom of expression has either been interpreted 
in a wider manner so as to include (or the notion has emerged as a corollary to) freedom of 
information.136 The idea of access to information continues as an undercurrent to this discussion.  
 
Early mention of privacy comes from the United States. Justice Thomas Cooley wrote of a right 
“to be let alone”. 137 Two years later, in 1890, the seminal article of Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”,138 argued the development of privacy was “inevitable”; that is, 
132 “… it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being 
supplied”: John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859). 
133 This was part of the claim made in Cook v Telegraph Media Group 2011] EWHC 763 (QB). 
134 Part of the claim made in Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22 (though this information pertained to the plaintiff’s 
medical condition.) 
135 This was a line used in Cook v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2011] EWHC 763 (QB) to avoid a strike out motion 
for the claimant’s action. 
136 But see the discussions with regards to the “right to be forgotten” in Section VI (i) and Section VII. 
137 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs which Arise Independent of Contract, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago:  Callaghan & Company, 1888) 29. 
138 (1890), 4 Harvard Law Review 193. William Prosser’s “Privacy” (1960) 48 California Law Review 383 has also 
been a foundational article. It is best to discuss it within the context of Ontario law based on the Ontario Court of 
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“[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for 
growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite 
protection, without the interposition of the legislature.”139 This notion of a cause of action in 
privacy has not been fully entrenched in the common law. Instead, there is a patchwork of 
protections. Primary amongst those has been privacy relating to personal data.  
 
Looking at the concept more generally, privacy speaks to a human desire to be separated from 
others in some form. While people are social, there is a notion of limiting the extent of social 
interaction. We do not interact with others at all points each day. It may be conjectured that we 
need privacy just as much as we need social interaction. The fact that there are certain activities 
that are done in private would seem to attest to the assertion. Still, there is an element of choice 
to privacy; that is, an individual may elect to not share aspects of her life with anyone else (just 
as one may elect to share the most private of experiences). This is about an entitlement to control 
that each person possesses: over information about oneself; about some space for the exclusion 
of others; and it can even be about the select disclosure of this information or the select invitation 
of others into these spaces. This information or these spaces, however, are not impregnable 
because others can intrude upon them. And yet, this intrusion does not automatically vitiate the 
entitlement. Instead, the infringement of that entitlement is recognised. Madam Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé contended that privacy was also an essential part of freedom.140 This point has 
not been as fully engaged in Canadian jurisprudence. And yet, there would seem to be a 
connection. If the concept of privacy is about exclusion (removing the individual or information 
about the individual from the public gaze) then freedom must accompany this choice; notably the 
choice as to what is excluded.  
 
In Canada, a starting point for discussion is the 1972 Canadian Task Force on Privacy and 
Computers which concluded that the concept of privacy consisted of three zones: 
1. territorial privacy: relating to that physical domain within which a claim to be left in solitude and 
tranquillity is advanced and recognized; 
2. privacy of the person: in which the physical person is protected from harassment, and protection 
is also given to the dignity of the human person; and 
3. informational privacy: which derives from the assumption that all information about a person is 
in a fundamental way his or her own, to be communicated or retained as one sees fit.141 
Just as Warren and Brandeis identified property as the first recognized area of some form of 
privacy, witnessed by tort law, so too does the Task Force place territorial privacy as the first 
distinct area in privacy speech. The second kind of privacy is personal and is more akin to a 
viewing of privacy as a human right.142 Personal privacy is in its infancy of recognition in 
Appeal’s reliance on its content in Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32. This appears in Section (iii) (b) ii. below and 
Section VII. 
139 Ibid 195. This comment is to be contrasted with the final section of this paper. In the United States a right of 
privacy has been found. However, other common law nations, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, have not 
done so. Warren and Brandeis’ comments are specific to the United States’ experience, and yet these words still 
have resonance for this analysis insofar as they articulate an early articulation of privacy.  
140 R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, [113]. Two decades later Daniel Solove contends that reputation and 
freedom are interlinked: The Future of Reputation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
141 Department of Communications and Department of Justice, Privacy and Computers: A Report of a Task Force 
(Ottawa:  Information Canada, 1972), 12-13. This approach has been received positively internationally: Ian Lawson, 
Privacy and Free Enterprise: The Legal Protection of Personal Information In the Private Sector (Ottawa:  Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre, 1992), 57. 
142 Privacy has been recognized internationally as a human right: International Labour Office (ILO) (1988) Human 
Rights: A Common Responsibility, Part I: Report of the Director-General to the 75th Session of the International 
Labour Conference (Geneva), 48-49; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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Canada. The last form of privacy is informational. EU law is particularly influential here as will 
be discussed below. At present, and applying one of Professor Prosser’s four torts,143 Sharpe J.A. 
in Jones v Tsige144 summarizes the state of privacy as a protected interest in Canada: “The 
question of whether the common law should recognize a cause of action in tort for invasion of 
privacy has been debated for the past one hundred and twenty years. Aspects of privacy have 
long been protected by causes of action such as breach of confidence, defamation, breach of 
copyright, nuisance, and various property rights. Although the individual’s privacy interest is a 
fundamental value underlying such claims, the recognition of a distinct right of action for breach 
of privacy remains uncertain.” 
 
The focus is on categories 2 and 3 as outlined by the 1972 Canadian Task Force, above. 
Canvassing the common law and considering the proliferation of internet-based forms of 
communication, these privacy interests may be interfered with in different ways. As an example 
of information privacy, an individual may reveal information about a person where the 
information was obtained in a private (re: confidential) setting. Privacy of the person, though, 
requires further nuance. The Task Force noted two forms of privacy here, physical and dignity. 
These may be interlinked such as an intrusion into a person’s private space that would negatively 
impact the person’s dignity (such as a barging into a bathroom when the person is using these 
facilities). However, to affect the dignity of the individual, there need not be a physical 
intrusion.145 There may also be an impact on the individual’s dignity by the disclosure of the 
information obtained by intruding upon the person in a private setting. And so, there can be 
overlap between categories 2 and 3; but there may also be discrete instances of each, independent 
of each other. Professor Moreham has written of discovery and disclosure in relation to 
informational privacy.146 It is suggested that these two terms apply more broadly to the present 
discussion insofar as they speak of the ways in which privacy interests can be infringed. The 
plaintiff may allege interference with her privacy interests by the means of discovery, the 
disclosure of the information or both.  
 
(a) Privacy in Canada 
The status of a right of privacy in Canada as a civil action is briefly surveyed here. Some 
provinces have created a statutory tort.147 If an individual’s Charter rights have been violated 
and that violation cannot be justified, the individual may apply to a court of competent 
jurisdiction under s.24(1) for a remedy. Section 32 limits this to federal and provincial laws and 
the actions of governments and government officials. More precisely focused on privacy are acts 
of federal and provincial law. The provincial versions are more pertinent here because they 
centre on private law redress in Ontario.  
 
Freedoms (1950), Eur.T.S. No.5, Art.8; also protected in the European Union: Commission v. Germany, [1992] 
ECR I-2575 (CJEU).  
143 William Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 California Law Review 383 [Prosser], 389. 
144 2012 ONCA 32, [15]. This decision has been widely discussed in the common law world. See for example, C v 
Holland [2012] NZHC 2155.  
145 N. A. Moreham further considers this point in “Intrusion into physical privacy” in N.A. Moreham and Sir Mark 
Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford: OUP, 2016), Chapter 10.  
146 N.A. Moreham, “A Conceptual Framework for the New Zealand Tort of Intrusion” (2016), 47 Victoria 
University Wellington Law Review 283, 288. 
147 British Columbia, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.373; Manitoba, The Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c.P125; Newfoundland, 
Privacy Act, R.S.N. 1990, c.P-22; Quebec, An Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private 
sector R.S.Q. c.P-39.1; Saskatchewan, Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c.P-24. 
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Focusing on information privacy (as the 1972 Task Force identified it above), the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act148 was passed in 2000 by the Canadian 
Parliament to ensure that steps were taken by private sector entities to securely handle personal 
data collected in the course of business pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC. This legislation relates 
directly to the discussion of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (and its predecessor) 
below.  
 
Within a Charter context (particularly the purposive approach to s.8), in Hunter v. Southam,149 
the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the existence of “the right to be left alone by other 
people” and that this right is independent of a tort of trespass.150 The right is to be “secure 
against encroachment upon the citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in a free and 
democratic society”.151 Canada’s highest court has recognized the Task Force on Privacy and 
Computers’ three areas of privacy as being protected by the Charter.152 Mr. Justice La Forest’s 
thoughts on informational privacy at that time were:  
Finally, there is privacy in relation to information. This too is based on the notion of the dignity and 
integrity of the individual. As the Task Force [1972 Task Force on Privacy and Computers] put it 
(p.13): “This notion of privacy derives from the assumption that all information about a person is in a 
fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit.” In modern 
society, especially, retention of information about oneself is extremely important. We may, for one 
reason or another, wish or be compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound where the 
reasonable expectations of the individual that the information shall remain confidential to the persons 
to whom, and restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected. . . . 
One further general point must be made, and that is that if privacy of the individual is to be protected, 
we cannot afford to vindicate it only after it has been violated. This is inherent in the notion of being 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Invasions of privacy must be prevented, and 
where privacy is outweighed by other societal claims, there must be clear rules setting forth the 
conditions in which it can be violated.153  
These words are made in the context of s.8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, protection 
against search and seizure. Still, the potency of these comments should not be merely 
distinguished. Outlined in this passage is an articulation of what protection of the individual’s 
personal data means and, furthermore, an argument of its societal importance. There is guidance 
for the present study within these remarks. Mister Justice Cory’s definition of defamation in Hill 
crystalizes the direct link with privacy: “[defamation] is an invasion of personal privacy”.154  
 
(b) Privacy in Ontario  
This section is divided into two. The first section outlines pertinent Ontario legislation; while 
keeping in mind these statutes may be of limited utility within the context of the Commission’s 
objectives. The second section delves into the more relevant area of the common law.  
i. Statutory recognition 
In keeping with the mandate outlined by the Commission, this research will not map out all law 
related to defamation and privacy. Here it will suffice to note the following acts: 
• Employment Standards Act155 
148 S.C. 2000 c 5. 
149 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
150 Ibid 159.  
151 Ibid. 
152 R. v Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 429. 
153Ibid 429 - 430.   
154 Hill 1179.  
155 S.O. 2000, c. 41, ss. 68, 70. 
 25 
                                                 
• Human Rights Code156 
• Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act157  
• Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act158 
• Occupational Health and Safety Act159 
• Personal Health Information Protection Act160 
 
There have been provincial statutes in British Columbia161 Manitoba,162 Newfoundland163 and 
Saskatchewan.164 These are similar in content insofar as they each provide for a limited right of 
action where the defendant acted wilfully (except for Manitoba) and without claim of right. 
These provisions are classified as granting a limited right because, taking the Newfoundland 
statute as an example, they contain language such as: “The nature and degree of privacy to which 
an individual is entitled … is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, regard being given to 
the lawful interests of others; and in determining whether the act or conduct of a person 
constitutes a violation of the privacy of an individual, regard shall be given to the nature, 
incidence, and occasion of the act or conduct and to the relationship, whether domestic or other, 
between the parties.”165  
 
It may be queried whether Ontario should develop its own Act (beyond that which exists for 
personal health information). To this, the response must include the equivocal assessment of 
Sharpe J.A. in Jones when he characterized the aforementioned provincial acts:  
Significantly, however, no provincial legislation provides a precise definition of what constitutes an 
invasion of privacy. The courts in provinces with a statutory tort are left with more or less the same task 
as courts in provinces without such statutes. The nature of these acts does not indicate that we are faced 
with a situation where sensitive policy choices and decisions are best left to the legislature. To the 
contrary, existing provincial legislation indicates that when the legislatures have acted, they have simply 
proclaimed a sweeping right to privacy and left it to the courts to define the contours of that right.166 
If there were to be an Ontario Act, it would seem that work would need to be undertaken to 
render it useful, such as some parameters as to what would constitute an invasion of privacy. 
There is scope for legislation which is more targeted; if that was determined to be a more viable 
route. Manitoba enacted The Intimate Image Protection Act,167 which came into force in January 
2016, and created a tort of non-consensual distribution of intimate images. This tort is actionable 
156 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. 
157 R.S.O.1990, c. F.31, s. 1. 
158 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56, ss. 1, 14, 21. 
159 R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1, s.63. The OHSA raises a particular issue of intersection between personal data protection and 
labour relations where the employer has requested medical information of the employee. The seriousness of the 
protection for personal medical information is demonstrated by the different means of regulation under which 
regulated health practitioners practice. For example, s.1(10) of O.Reg 799/93 under the Nursing Act S.O. 1991, c.32 
and s.22 of R.R.O. Reg. 965 under the Public Hospitals Act R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40; as well as PHIPA. As the 
implications for employment are not part of the remit of the Commission’s project, this point will not be considered 
further.  
160 S.O. 2004, c 3 [PHIPA]. 
161 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c.373. 
162 Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987 c.P125. 
163 Privacy Act, R.S.N. 1990, c.P-22. 
164 Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c.P-24. 
165 Privacy Act, R.S.N. 1990, c.P-22, s 3(2). 
166 Jones [54]. 
167 S.M. 2015 c.42, s.11. Of interest, New Zealand common law also protects a similar form of intrusion: C v 
Holland, [2012] NZHC 2155.  
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per se168 and arises when a “person who distributes an intimate image of another person knowing 
that the person depicted in the image did not consent to the distribution, or being reckless as to 
whether or not that person consented to the distribution, commits a tort against that other person.
”It is with interest that s.12 of the Act is noted because this provision deals with the expectation 
of privacy, a challenge for many jurisdictions. Manitoba has determined that an expectation of 
privacy regarding an intimate image is not lost if s/he “(a) consented to another person recording 
the image; or (b) provided the image to another person; in circumstances where that other person 
knew or ought reasonably to have known that the image was not to be distributed to any other 
person.”The Ontario case of Jane Doe 464533 vindicates the importance of these parameters. 
Anticipating the discussion regarding the development of breach of confidence below, this 
statute recalls that the common law has not found the expectation of privacy is necessarily lost 
when private matters are shared with a particular audience (for example a friend). It retains the 
developed concept of confidence in law in order to achieve this end.169   
 
A further aspect of the consideration of statutory recognition is whether or not the statutes 
preclude common law claims. This point was considered in Hopkins v Kay170 where the plaintiffs 
brought a class action claim for intrusion upon seclusion (based upon Jones v Tsige) and the 
defendant sought to dismiss the claim by asserting that the Personal Health Information 
Protection Act precluded the common law action. Lending some consistency to the jurisprudence 
in this area, Sharpe J.A. provided the unanimous decision of the court. In considering whether 
PHIPA constituted an exhaustive code, he found that there were neither explicit nor implicit 
indications in the legislation leading to a conclusion that the Act precluded the plaintiffs from 
making a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Comparing the requirements for the statute and the 
common law action, Sharpe J.A. determined: “The elements of the common law cause of action 
are, on balance, more difficult to establish than a breach of PHIPA, and therefore it cannot be 
said that a plaintiff, by launching a common law action, is “circumventing” any substantive 
provision of PHIPA. The aspects of the common law that may at first glance appear more lenient 
are not, upon closer consideration, significantly advantageous.”171  
 
ii. Common Law 
In Ontario, there have been lethargic moves towards recognition of a right of privacy. For 
instance, a pleading alleging invasion of privacy was not dismissed on the basis that the right 
does not exist.172 At times, there has been a vagueness to how the law protects privacy. For 
example in Motherwell v Motherwell,173 a daughter made several harassing phone calls to her 
mother. The essence of the claim against the daughter was breach of privacy and yet the action 
was in private nuisance; that is, the daughter’s activities interfered with the plaintiff’s enjoyment 
of land. The appellate court cautioned regarding the awkward legal development that may ensue 
from this action: “the interests of our developing jurisprudence would be better served by 
approaching invasion of privacy by abuse of the telephone system as a new category”.174 An 
Ontario example comes from Saccone v Orr175where the plaintiff was suing for the secret audio 
168 S.M. 2015 c.42, s.11(2). 
169 Further discussion of breach of confidence appears in subsection (iv) below. 
170 2015 ONCA 112. 
171 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32, [52]. 
172 Capan v Capan (1980), 14 C.C.L.T. 191 (Ont. H.C.J.). 
173 (1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (Alta. S.C. (A.D.)). 
174 Ibid [26]. 
175 (1982), 34 O.R. (2d) 317 (Ont. Co. Ct.). 
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recording of a discussion between the two parties and which the defendant then replayed at a city 
council meeting (ironically to vindicate his status as someone who does not breach confidences). 
During examination-in-chief, Saccone testified (in the court words): “Really, all he's claiming is 
the embarrassment which he feels he suffered”. The court in Roth v. Roth176 found that a right of 
privacy does exist – “employees in Ontario do have a right to privacy” – the only question being 
whether there is a remedy for violation of such a right. 177 Unfortunately, these cases offer 
nothing more than commentary since a common law right to privacy has not been established. 
Instead the matter has been dealt with through torts such as nuisance and defamation. Mr. Justice 
Adams’ comments in Ontario (Attorney-General) v. Dieleman178 explained the reluctance to 
recognize the common law right of privacy: “If there is to be an independent tort of invasion of 
privacy in Canada, the literature and the experience in the United States reveals the need to be 
sensitive to the close connection between privacy and freedom of expression.” 179  If these 
decisions hint at tacit recognition of the right, there are further issues to engage. Mr. Justice 
Linden suggested in 2001 that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms may further propel privacy 
rights to the forefront.180   
 
As greater acceptance of privacy claims at common law have developed, there has been a need to 
make distinctions between defamation and privacy actions. In Warman v Grosvenor, 181 the 
plaintiff lawyer could recover damages in defamation and assault, but not in invasion of privacy, 
for the defendant’s “two-year ‘campaign of terror’ against him, achieved through postings on the 
Internet and personal e-mails.”182 Some of these postings included Warman’s homes address as 
well as aerial photos of the location of his residence. Although constituting an invasion of 
privacy, the court did not find that these facts grounded a separation action for damages which 
was distinct from the defamation and assault claims. 183  On one level this decision is 
understandable insofar as it follows the principle that there will not be double compensation for 
the same action. However, it is unclear how this distinction holds up if the subject matter in 
question (personal information) could itself ground a separate actionable harm such as the 
invasion of privacy. To say that the same facts are compensated by defamation seems to elide 
two torts and therefore make it difficult for a clear separation to be followed.  
 
The most pertinent movement within Ontario as it relates to the present project is the Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Jones v Tsige.184 Jones was a case about informational privacy.185 
This decision arguably extends the notion of information privacy identified by the 1972 Task 
Force. Sharpe J.A., in Jones, further contributed to the conversation of the implications of 
developments in privacy in law for defamation. Briefly, the facts are:  
176 (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 740 ((Gen. Div.)). 
177 Ibid 757-758. The decision was based in part on the idea that the right of privacy “has been acknowledged in 
years of arbitral jurisprudence”.  
178 (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 449 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).  
179 Ibid 688. Theorists on a right of privacy have opined the interconnection between a right of privacy and a right to 
freedom of speech: Eric Barendt “Privacy as a Constitutional Right and Value” in Peter Birks (ed.) Privacy and 
Loyalty (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997) 1-14,13. 
180 Allen Linden, Canadian Tort Law 7th ed. (Butterworths: Markham, 2001), 56 – 60.  
181 (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 663 (S.C.J.). 
182 Ibid [1]. 
183 “the conduct causing the harm is recoverable in damages for defamation and assault and there is no separate 
tortious conduct resulting in separate harm, in my view, that is recoverable by the plaintiff for a tort of invasion of 
privacy”: Ibid [70]. 
184 2012 ONCA 32 
185 Jones [66]. 
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In July 2009, the appellant, Sandra Jones, discovered that the respondent, Winnie Tsige, had been 
surreptitiously looking at Jones’ banking records. Tsige and Jones did not know each other despite the 
fact that they both worked for the same bank and Tsige had formed a common-law relationship with 
Jones’ former husband. As a bank employee, Tsige had full access to Jones’ banking information and, 
contrary to the bank’s policy, looked into Jones’ banking records at least 174 times over a period of 
four years.186  
The legal issue for the appellate court was whether the motion judge erred by granting summary 
judgment and dismissing Jones’ claim for damages on the ground that Ontario law does not 
recognize the tort of breach of privacy. Determining that Prosser’s intrusion upon seclusion tort 
applied to the present facts, Sharpe J.A. adopted the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts187 
definition: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”188 Jones confirmed 
the existence of a right of action for intrusion upon seclusion.189 The plaintiff must establish: “(i) 
the intrusion was unauthorized; (ii) the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person; 
(iii) the matter intruded upon was private; and (iv) the intrusion caused anguish and suffering.” 
For the court, Sharpe J.A. found that the claim was made out and awarded $10,000 in damages 
(what he called a mid-point award). 
 
Jones has brought into consideration (particularly in Ontario) the four torts identified as 
protecting a general right to privacy pioneered by William Prosser in his 1960 article ‘‘Privacy”. 
(Jones relied upon Prosser’s category “intrusion upon seclusion”.) The American Law Institute 
adopted Prosser’s categories in the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts §652: 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the 
interest of the other. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by: 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (intentionally intruding, physically or 
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person) §652B 
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; §652C 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; (giving publicity to a matter concerning 
the private life of another if the matter publicized is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public) §652D 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public. (giving publicity to a 
matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light, if the false light in 
which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the actor had 
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false 
light in which the other would be placed) §652E 
A question to be considered is whether Sharpe J.A. brought Prosser’s categories (and by 
extension the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts) within the ambit of Ontario common law. 
In Jones, Sharpe J.A. surveyed the caselaw pertaining to claims for protection of privacy. Some 
of the cases have been noted above. He also determined that there were decisions which could be 
categorized within Prosser’s four tort listing. For example, he determined that Athans v 
Canadian Adventure Camps Ltd. 190  was a successful claim for appropriation of personality 
insofar as the defendant had used a photograph of the plaintiff (an expert water-skier) in 
advertisements. The potential implications for defamation in the age of the internet are apparent. 
186 Ibid [2]. 
187 The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts (1977). An online version of the provisions 
is found at: https://cyber.harvard.edu/privacy/Privacy_R2d_Torts_Sections.htm.  
188 Jones [19]. 
189 Ibid [65]. 
190 (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 425 (H.C.J.) 
 29 
                                                 
For example, category 2(c) (§652D) may interact with reputation interests (classically falling 
into defamation law) where personal information that may affect an individual’s reputation is 
disclosed on a social media platform. 
 
The treatment of Sharpe J.A.’s decision in Jones has been positive (though cautious). The court 
in Jane Doe 464533 v ND191 applied the reasoning to a situation of ‘revenge porn’; though this 
case remains inconclusive at present.192 Jane Doe 464533 was the victim of an ex-partner posting 
a sexually explicit video of her on the internet without her consent or knowledge. The video was 
made at the persistent urging of the defendant. Defamation is not a claim that could be made 
here. And yet, the reputational (not to mention emotional and psychological) harm remains a 
point for significant consideration.    
 
The Federal Court of Appeal interpreted Jones as opening the door to a common law actionable 
tort in privacy (limited to intrusion upon seclusion); though it found in this instance that the 
pleadings were not supported by material facts. 193  The court also interpreted the tort of 
“unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life”. It adopted the comment appended to 
this section of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts which stated: 
It is one of a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.  
… it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate a 
fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons. On the 
other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill 
distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an 
address to a large audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as it is used in 
this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between private and public communication. 
There is a threshold to be met in order for the publicity to be actionable. The impression given by 
the American Law Institute is that unreasonable publicity does not include communication to a 
person or a small group. The publicity must be sufficient to reach the public. In Canada, the 
notion of a threshold has not be canvassed in the defamation setting as it has been in the UK 
where s.1 of the Defamation Act 2013 establishes a threshold of serious harm for a claim to 
proceed. And yet, with this privacy tort, a threshold has clearly been contemplated in order to 
successfully advance such an action, thereby meeting the claim’s elements: “publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another if the matter publicized is of a kind that would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public”. In Canada v 
John Doe, the Federal Court of Appeal scrutinized the threshold of publicity and found there 
could be no claim advanced based on the absence of material facts.194 
 
This question of threshold, with the capacity of online communication, remains one to consider 
further. There may be an opening for the publicity threshold to be met even when 
communication has been to a small group. The UK decision in McManus v Beckham 195 
illustrates. This is a matter of slander and third party publication. The facts are as follows. 
191 2016 ONSC 541. 
192 The decision was initially resolved by way of default judgment (the defendant failing to appear). However, 
default judgment was set aside on 27 January 2017 (2016 ONSC 4920) and subsequent leave to appeal the setting 
aside was denied the same month (2017 ONSC 127). As it stands, this case may proceed to trial. Still, it is important 
to note that in the decision denying leave to appeal, the court cited [47] the defendant’s sworn affidavit that seemed 
to suggest a challenge on the basis of quantum of damages as opposed to liability itself. The difficulty is that, in 
setting aside default judgment, the court set aside both the finding of liability as well as quantum of damages.  
193 Canada v John Doe 2016 FCA 191 [John Doe], [52]-[53]. 
194 John Doe [46]. 
195 [2002] 1 WLR 2982 (CA) [McManus]. 
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Victoria Beckham enters McManus’ shop and declared that the sports memorabilia there signed 
by David Beckham (her husband) was fake. As has been the custom, paparazzi followed her into 
this shop and then published her statements. McManus sued in defamation. The issue was 
whether or not it was reasonably foreseeable that her claims would be reported in the media.196 
The Court of Appeal found in favour of McManus but it had difficulty in balancing between 
when a defendant should be liable for all the consequences set in train by his conduct and the 
need to limit liability to his own actions.197 A defendant may be liable where a reasonable person 
in the same position as the defendant would have been aware that publication of her comments 
would take place. And so, the potential for communication to a small audience, though in itself 
below the threshold of publicity, may cross that threshold in an instance readily familiar to users 
of information technology and in particular social media where a posting may be shared to an 
unlimited number of individuals.  
 
(iv) Breach of confidence 
Given the developing notion of privacy at common law, it is likely plaintiffs will also pursue 
other legal avenues to protect their reputations. With this in mind, further consideration is 
whether an action in breach of confidence can be a path for protection of reputation where 
defamation cannot be. This point of law is complicated by two matters. First, there remains 
ambiguity about the concept of breach of confidence that renders the action equivocal. Second, 
breach of confidence originates in equity but has been used as a tort. In Canada, this cause of 
action has been classified, by the Supreme Court of Canada, as a hybrid that draws on equity and 
common law principles.198 The link to reputation is identified by the Manitoba Court of Appeal: 
“Tort law has recognized that a breach of confidence in certain circumstances may create a cause 
of action”.199 Courts are afforded discretion when it comes to remedies in breach of confidence 
instances. In the U.K., the cause of action has been more recently recognized as a tort, called 
misuse of private information.200 This tort has been used to protect personal information of a 
highly private nature (such as sexual liaisons).  
196 It could also be added whether or not it would be reasonable for the press to report the claims. 
197 “What the law is striving to achieve in this area is a just and reasonable result by reference to the position of a 
reasonable person in the position of the defendant. If a defendant is actually aware (i) that what she says or does is 
likely to be reported, and (ii) that if she slanders someone that slander is likely to be repeated in whole or in part, 
there is no injustice in her being held responsible for the damage that the slander causes via that publication. I would 
suggest further that if a jury were to conclude that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should have 
appreciated that there was a significant risk that what she said would be repeated in whole or in part in the press and 
that would increase the damage cause by the slander, it is not unjust that the defendant should be liable for it. Thus I 
would suggest a discretion along the above lines rather than by reference to foreseeability”: McManus, [34] (per 
Waller L.J.) 
“The root question is whether D, who has slandered C, should justly be held responsible for damage which has been 
occasioned, or directly occasioned, by a further publication by X. I think it plain that there will be cases where that 
will be entirely just. The observation of Bingham LJ as he then was in Slipper’s case [1991] 1 All E.R. 165 at 179, 
[1991] 1 QB 283 at 300 that ‘[d]efamatory statements are objectionable not least because of their propensity to 
percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs’ states an ancient and persistent truth...” 
“...It must rather be demonstrated that D foresaw that the further publication would probably take place, or that D (or 
a reasonable person in D’s position) should have so foreseen and that in consequence increased damage to C would 
ensue” : McManus, [42]-[43] (per Laws L.J.). 
198 Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142. 
199 Grant v Winnipeg Regional Health Authority 2015 MBCA 44, [118]. 
200 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2016] UKSC 26. 
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(a) Canada 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources 
Ltd 201 has been the starting point for discussion. There, the court established the test for a 
successful claim. The plaintiff has to establish the criteria set out by Megarry J. (as he then was) 
in Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd.202 (and adopted in LAC Minerals): 
In my judgment, three elements are normally required if, apart from contract, a case of breach of 
confidence is to succeed.  First, the information itself … must "have the necessary quality of confidence 
about it."  Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation 
of confidence.  Thirdly, there must be an unauthorized use of that information to the detriment of the 
party communicating it… 
Mister Justice Sopinka, in Lac Minerals, articulated the action in this way: “The foundation of 
action for breach of confidence does not rest solely on one of the traditional jurisdictional bases 
for action of contract, equity or property. The action is sui generis relying on all three to enforce 
the policy of the law that confidences be respected.”203 Recalling the facts of that case, the 
Supreme Court of Canada found that the defendant, Lac Minerals, had misused confidential 
information it obtained from Corona in the course of joint venture negotiations in order to 
advance its own commercial opportunities.  
 
As a result of breach of confidence’s hybrid nature (equity and common law principles), the 
wider range of remedies that could be awarded in Canadian cases of breach of confidence was 
confirmed in Cadbury Schweppes;204 though LAC Minerals provides a clear example. In Lac 
Minerals, the Supreme Court imposed on the defendant a constructive trust regarding the mine 
property in question (which the defendant obtained using confidential information from the 
plaintiff). This provided for the conveyance of the land, minus expenses the defendant incurred 
in the mine’s development. The Supreme Court of Canada found no reason for “frisson of 
apprehension or uncertainty” with the hybrid nature of breach of confidence.205 Instead, the 
“jurisdictional basis supporting the claim” (as Sopinka J. described it)206 aligns the remedy with 
the policy objective of that particular claim. And so, the breach of confidence in question being 
described as contractual, tortious, proprietary or trust constitutes the means of determining the 
appropriateness of the remedy; not a limitation of the court’s jurisdiction.207 Parties, then, may 
contract so as to limit or negate other general duties, such as tort or confidentiality; that is, a 
general duty “must yield to the parties’ superior right to arrange their rights and duties”.208 
Where there is a claim in breach of confidence, the objective for the court “is to put the confider 
in as good a position as it would have been in but for the breach.”209 In Cadbury, the breach 
resulted in placing the plaintiff behind the defendant in terms of competition (after Cadbury had 
shared its recipe with the defendant). This was a lost opportunity. The distinction for the present 
study is that retaining some level of confidentiality (in the nature of maintaining privacy) of 
information is not similar to a lost opportunity in the commercial sense. In this way, the action 
for breach of confidence where information has been imparted in a situation of confidence and 
then subsequently disclosed falls into the tort category.   
 
201 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574. 
202 [1969] R.P.C. 41 (Ch.), 47. Adopted in by the House of Lords in MGN v Campbell [2004] UKHL 22, [13]. 
203 Lac Minerals 615. 
204 It was also found that breach of confidence no longer requires there to be a fiduciary relationship: Cadbury [60]. 
205 Cadbury [28]. 
206 Lac Minerals 615. 
207 Cadbury [25]. 
208 BG Checo International v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12, 27. 
209 Cadbury [61]. 
 32 
                                                 
An action in breach of confidence in Canada pertaining to disclosure of information where there 
is an argument based upon confidence (outside of confidentiality clauses in employment 
contracts) is not an area that has been explored in as much detail, compared to the U.K.. Despite 
the Supreme Court’s guidance, the merging of common law and equity principles can be a 
complicating factor in this setting. Still, guiding points may be sketched out pertaining to law in 
Ontario. Further guidance can be sought from the UK cases which contemplate both a breach of 
confidence and a derivative tort, misuse of private information. The U.K example is explored in 
the immediately ensuing section.  
 
A starting point must be the courts’ view of the fusion of common law and equity. In Canada, 
there has been an emphasis placed upon fusion that remains open to development stemming from 
contemporary influences; as opposed to being set within one of the two streams. 210 Further 
outlining a philosophy regarding breach of confidence as applied to the topic of protection of 
reputation through a law related to privacy, Sharpe J.A. in Jones v Tsige brought the tort of 
intrusion upon seclusion into Ontario law because it “would amount to an incremental step that is 
consistent with the role of this court to develop the common law in a manner consistent with the 
changing needs of society.”211 A trajectory for further development of this area of the common 
law appears to be present. 
 
Most often, the claim for breach of confidence arises in the context of commercial 
relationships.212 This tendency makes the decision in Jane Doe 464533 v ND213 noteworthy. 
Jane Doe 464533 constitutes one of the sad cases that has arisen from internet communications. 
The decision was initially resolved by way of default judgment (the defendant failing to appear). 
However, default judgment was set aside by a judgment released on 27 January 2017214 and 
leave to appeal the setting aside was denied the same month.215 As it stands, this case may 
proceed to trial. Still, it is important to note that in the decision denying leave to appeal, the court 
cited the defendant’s sworn affidavit that seemed to suggest a challenge on the basis of quantum 
of damages as opposed to liability itself. The difficulty is that, in setting aside default judgment, 
the court set aside the finding of liability as well as quantum of damages. The decision of Mister 
Justice Stinson finding in favour of Jane Doe 464533 will be focused upon as an example of how 
the breach of confidence may be utilised in the non-commercial setting.   
 
The facts of this case were noted in section V (iii) (b) ii. above. As part of the action, the court 
found that the first two elements of the test were met: the video was sent based upon the 
assurance that the video would only be viewed by ND;216 and the video “was communicated to 
210 Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 64 (CA), [290]: “While no doubt 
the categories that were shaped by the historical influences of common law and equity of law remain relevant for 
certain purposes, the spirit of the fusion of the two streams is the dominant theme and influence in the modern era. 
In our view, the modern conception of our private law as a fusion of equitable and legal principles provides added 
weight to the argument that the discretionary factors associated with equitable remedies may be considered in the 
present case. For these reasons, we reject the contention that the sui generis right of aboriginal title should be rigidly 
classified as falling exclusively into one of the historic streams of our legal history, completely immune from the 
influence of the other.” 
211 2012 ONCA 32, [65]. 
212 For example, Sabre Inc. v International Air Transport Association, 2011 ONCA 747. 
213 2016 ONSC 541 [Jane Doe 464533]. 
214 2016 ONSC 4920. 
215 2017 ONSC 127. 
216 Jane Doe 464533 [20]. 
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the defendant on the express basis that he would treat it as confidential”.217 In finding the final 
criteria satisfied (an unauthorized use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it), Mister Justice Stinson wrote: “I see no rational basis to distinguish between 
economic harm and psychological, emotional and physical harm, such as was experienced by the 
plaintiff in the present case. In any event, the possible future adverse impact on the plaintiff’s 
career and employment prospects arising from the possibility that the video may someday 
resurface, also demonstrates actionable harm.”218  
 
The adage in law is that sad cases make for bad law. It is contended that the remarkably sad facts 
here do not overshadow how it illustrates the limitations of defamation as the sole means of 
redress for reputation claims; boundaries that are readily recognisable when internet-based forms 
of communication are employed. Moreover, the case bridges an important boundary for the 
hybrid breach of confidence action in that it illustrates the applicability of the claim to a non-
commercial context. Finally, Jane Doe 464533 stands out as a case study in 1) the profoundly 
negative effects on reputation of remarks published using internet-based forms of 
communication and 2) the ways in which the common law in particular can be adapted to the 
challenges posed by innovation in information technology. On the critical side, the decision is 
light on treatment of these legal claims; but this is perhaps the by-product of the absence of 
arguments for the defendant. Overall, there are indications, though few, that demonstrate 
reputation interests can be defended using the common law and this is an important step at this 
early stage of jurisprudence. 
(b) United Kingdom – breach of confidence to misuse of private information 
A starting point is offered by Francis Gurry in his treatise Breach of Confidence:219 “In a breach 
of confidence action, the court’s concern is for the protection of a confidence which has been 
created by the disclosure of confidential information by the confider to the confidant. The court’s 
attention is thus focused on the protection of the confidential information because it has been the 
medium for the creation of a relationship of confidence; its attention is not focused on the 
information as a medium by which a pre-existing [fiduciary] duty is breached.” As noted above, 
the modern court analysis commences with Megarry J (as he then was) in Coco v. A. N. Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd..220 It is worth noting that the UK Law Commission in 1974 recommended what 
today we would see as an assumption of responsibility for there to be liability in breach of 
confidence. The Commission wrote (with reference to companies): “it is sufficient for the 
plaintiff to establish that the defendant should have realised that the information was being given 
to him in confidence: in contrast, our propositions would make it necessary for the plaintiff to go 
further and show that the defendant, either expressly or by implication, accepted an obligation to 
treat the information as confidential.”221 Refraining from imposing this standard on plaintiffs 
(especially non-corporate individuals) has focussed instead on either the relationship of 
confidence or the nature of information in question as being confidential. If it were to be required 
that plaintiffs established defendants’ assumption of responsibility for the confidentiality of the 
information, it would arguably have rendered this action quite limited in scope and so less likely 
217 Ibid [23]. 
218 Ibid [24]. 
219 Francis Gurry, Breach of Confidence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 161-162 (emphasis in original). 
220 [1969] R.P.C. 41 (Ch.), 47. Adopted in by the House of Lords in, for example, MGN v Campbell [2004] UKHL 
22, [13]. 
221 Working Paper No. 58, Breach of Confidence (London: HMSO, 1974), [72]. 
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to have developed in its current form.222 Certainly the law in this area was permitted to develop 
(when it otherwise would not have)223 when the recommendation of the Law Commission in 
1981 to abolish the action in breach of confidence and replace it with a statutory tort of breach of 
confidence224 was ignored.  
 
For some time, English common law has recognized there are certain occasions during which 
information therein obtained cannot be published to others. The foundational example of breach 
of confidence is Prince Albert v Strange 225  where the court enjoined a third party from 
publishing copies of the claimant’s etchings as well as a catalogue describing the same. The 
purported sale of copies or the creation of a catalogue could only have been accomplished by 
surreptitiously obtaining the items in breach of trust, confidence or contract.226 The only means 
by which these etchings could have been made public was through the gift of some to friends or 
the delivery of others to a printer for impressions to be made. At the time, relationships of 
confidence stood out as the essence of the judgment. Perhaps with a 21st century revisionist 
perspective, we may look at Strange as an early decision about privacy. It is suggested that it can 
be both. Materials were shared within a selective group for limited purposes. The court ruled 
Prince Albert had maintained the privacy of these items; that is, he was not releasing them to the 
public but sharing them within a confined social (friends) and commercial (printer) space.227 For 
present purposes, in a time of widespread use of information technology, Strange contests the 
assertion that once information is posted, the author has no control over what is done next. While 
he had given the etchings to some friends, this did not vitiate Prince Albert’s exclusive claim 
over the items.   
 
The well-known decision in Argyll v Argyll228 continues the early recognition of the confines of 
private information by ‘unambiguously” finding it appropriate to protect personal confidences.229 
At this point, the action was still set within existing relationships of confidence. The claimant 
successfully restrained the defendants (who included her former husband) from publishing 
personal details of her life that she had shared during their marriage. Establishing that a 
contractual relationship was not necessary, the court found the publication of these personal 
details to be a breach of confidence warranting an injunction:   
It thus seems to me that the policy of the law, so far from indicating that communication between 
husband and wife should be excluded from protection against breaches of confidence given by the 
court in accordance with Prince Albert v Strange strongly favours its inclusion and in view of that 
policy it can hardly be an objection that such communications are not limited to business matters.230 
 
222 The Law Commission’s concern was the strategic use of breach of confidences; that is, the creation of "the 
unsolicited confidence" where the recipient of the information could not decide whether or not to assume the 
responsibility.  
223 As noted by Baroness Hale in Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No 3) [2007] UKHL 21, [307]. 
224  Report on Breach of Confidence (1981) (Law Com No. 110 ) (Cmnd. 8558 ), 103. 
225 (1849) 1 H & TW 5 1302 (Ch.).   
226 Ibid 1311. 
227 On the commercial point, the finding of the defendant’s ‘gross breach of faith’ in Pollard v Photographic Co 
(1889), 40 Ch. D 345 reinforces the necessity in obtaining permission to sell photographs of an individual who did 
not give consent. Providing private material to a company for the purpose of reproducing the item is not tantamount 
to consent to reproduction by the proprietor beyond the customer’s personal consumption. 
228 [1967] Ch. 302. 
229 Tanya Aplin, Lionel Bently, Philip Johnson, Simon Malynicz, Gurry on Breach of Confidence: The Protection of 
Confidential Information 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2012) [6.56]. 
230 Argyll 329.   
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More generally, where the defendant has been found to have used (without consent) confidential 
information obtained from the plaintiff, there will have been a violation of the claimant’s 
rights.231 Mere disclosure of personal information does not vitiate claims to retain the privacy 
thereof unless the subject matter were disclosed or known to a substantial audience. This 
principle was derived from Stephens v Avery 232  where the issue was whether confidential 
disclosures about a person’s sexual conduct were protected. Stephens admitted to a former friend 
(and the first defendant in the case) that she had an affair with a woman (who had been 
subsequently murdered by the woman’s husband). The friend passed on this information to the 
Mail on Sunday (second defendant). In granting an injunction the court rejected the defendants’ 
arguments that the subject matter should not be protected because it constituted gross immoral 
conduct and that the information was known to the parties and so could not be confidential. 
Regarding the latter, the court ruled: “Information only ceases to be capable of protection as 
confidential when it is in fact known to a substantial number of people.”233 The authors of Gurry 
on Breach of Confidence have identified two strands of judicial thinking from this early period: 
1. Obligations of confidence in the area of personal information very much serve privacy 
interests. 
2. Importance is attached to relationships in which personal, confidential information may 
be disclosed.  
The relationships, however, had been a closed category, limited to matrimonial or some special 
type of relationship (such as in Prince Albert). Commenting on the action in breach of 
confidence in 1974, the Law Commission of the United Kingdom viewed the action as, more 
realistically, sui generis.234 
 
The House of Lords moved away from a closed category of relationships to recognising 
circumstances in which a duty of confidence arises in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers 
(No2)235 when Lord Goff wrote:  
… a duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person (the 
confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is 
confidential, with the effect that it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded 
from disclosing the information to others. … 
I have expressed the circumstances in which the duty arises in broad terms, not merely to embrace those 
cases where a third party receives information from a person who is under a duty of confidence in respect 
of it, knowing that it has been disclosed by that person to him in breach of his duty of confidence, but 
also to include certain situations, beloved of law teachers - where an obviously confidential document is 
wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, or where an obviously confidential 
document, such as a private diary, is dropped in a public place, and is then picked up by a passer-by 
The duty of confidence grew slowly during this time to include, for example, instances where a 
certain kind of information was viewed as confidential for the purposes of safety.236 Still, in 
Spycatcher, the House of Lords maintained that breach of confidence was equitable. 
 
The moment of change came with Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd.237 when English 
law adapted the action in breach of confidence for the purposes of protecting the unauthorized 
disclosure of personal information. Lord Hoffmann wrote: 
231 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203. 
232 [1988] Ch. 449. 
233 Ibid 454. 
234 Working Paper No. 58, Breach of Confidence (London: HMSO, 1974), 11. 
235 [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (HL), 281. 
236 Venables and Thompson v News Groups Newspaper [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1038 (CA), [78], [81]. 
237 [2004] UKHL 22 (HL), [44] and [55] respectively.  
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Breach of confidence was an equitable remedy and equity traditionally fastens on the conscience of one 
party to enforce equitable duties which arise out of his relationship with the other. So the action did not 
depend upon the personal nature of the information or extent of publication but upon whether a 
confidential relationship existed between the person who imparted the information and the person who 
received it. … 
Instead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to confidential personal 
information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – the 
right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and 
respect of other people. 
Facilitating this change was the coming into force of the Human Rights Act, 1998 which brought 
the European Convention of Human Rights into English law. Its direct application to English law 
can be seen, for example, in s.6(1): “It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right.” As with defamation, here too Articles 8 and 10 of the 
ECHR form the crux of the tension. The text of these provisions are provided here:  
Article 8 
Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 10 
Freedom of Expression 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority. . . 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to 
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society . . . for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence... 
With Campbell, the tort of misuse of private information slowly emerged from breach of 
confidence. This developed in the United Kingdom partly due to the absence of a more general 
tort of privacy. 238 The balancing of the two Convention rights is expressed in English law 
through the test developed for this tort. It was noted at the start of this section but warrants 
repetition here: 
1) Does the claimant have a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in respect of the information in 
question? If yes, then:  
2) Does the claimant’s interest in maintaining their right to informational privacy outweigh the 
defendant’s interest in publishing the information in pursuit of their right to freedom of expression?239 
Lord Hoffmann explicates upon the aim as a “cause of action … [which] focuses upon … the 
right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the 
esteem and respect of other people”.240 With regards to the first part of the test, Sir Anthony 
Clarke M.R. in Murray v Express Newspapers plc241 stated: “The approved test is not whether a 
person of ordinary sensibilities would find the publication highly offensive or objectionable . . . 
but … what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if he or she was placed in the 
same position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity.” At the second stage of the test, 
238 Kaye v Robertson [1991] F.S.R. 62 (CA); Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53. 
239 As stated in a number of cases: see for example Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22 and the extended discussion 
in ETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 439, [10]. This tort is the renamed action for breach of 
confidence: Campbell [14]. Whether or not this tort is now separate from the equitable cause of action remains to be 
determined: Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311 (leave to appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
on the tort issue refused 23 July 2015). 
240 Campbell [51]. 
241 [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
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balancing requires “an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being 
claimed in the individual case”.242 Further guidance on the balancing of these two rights comes 
from s.12(3) of the Human Rights Act, 1998: no interim injunction is to be granted “unless the 
court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed”. 
In Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee,243 Lord Nicholls reinforced the high standard to satisfying 
the criteria for injunctive relief: “the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly 
slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court that he will 
probably (“more likely than not”) succeed at the trial.”  
 
The development of the relationship of confidence continued consideration of the intersection 
between protection of reputation and privacy. In McKennit v Ash, 244  the defendant learned 
intimate information through her friendship with the claimant. The court prevented Ash from 
publishing the information because the intended publication contained material disclosed in 
confidence. The focus on a pre-existing relationship of confidence where intimate or personal 
information is likely to be imparted is a lasting facet of this and other decisions.245  
 
Taking us closer to the context of statements on internet-based platforms, the authors of Gurry 
contend that some of these decisions establish a principle: “A person’s opinions concerning 
matters in the public domain, as well as their feelings and emotional state, have been regarded as 
giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 246  Presently there is greater nuance 
developing in the characterization and therefore legal implications of relationships. The Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Murray demonstrated: 
As we see it, the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a broad one, which 
takes account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the attributes of the claimant, the 
nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the 
nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be 
inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the 
information came into the hands of the publisher.247  
In Douglas v Hello! Magazine, 248  the House of Lords moved from a determination of 
establishing a relationship of confidence, to whether the information in question (on an objective 
basis) is confidential. The guidance drawn from Douglas is that for the purposes of breach of 
confidence, the action may be established through a relationship of confidence, but it may also 
be achieved by assessing the nature of the information itself. OK! was seeking to enforce an 
obligation of confidence imposed upon all attendees of the wedding regarding any photographs 
by an agreement it reached with the plaintiffs. OK! sought to enforce this right against Hello! 
when it had published photos taken by a photographer it had paid for surreptitious photos. The 
ruling shoehorns the concept of information into the reasoning: “the point of the transaction was 
that each picture would be treated as a separate piece of information which OK! would have the 
exclusive right to publish.”249 While useful for the present study, it is not an easy fit to call each 
photo a piece of information within the context of Douglas.  
 
242 In re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47. 
243 [2004] UKHL 44, [22]. 
244 McKennit v Ash [2006] Q.B. 73 (CA) 
245  Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales, [2008] Ch. 57 (CA); Lord Browne of Madingley v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] Q.B. 103 (CA) 
246 Gurry [6.140] 
247 Murray v Express Newspapers, [2008] EWCA 446, [36]. 
248 Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No 3) [2007] UKHL 21. 
249 Ibid [122]. 
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The Court of Appeal in Google Inc v Vidal-Hall 250  considered whether misuse of private 
information was a tort or an action in breach of confidence. The matter arose within the context 
of a civil procedure issue (whether service of a tort claim outside of the jurisdiction can be made 
in this instance). Concluding this is a tort, the Court wrote:  
Against the background we have described, and in the absence of any sound reasons of policy or 
principle to suggest otherwise, we have concluded in agreement with the judge that misuse of private 
information should now be recognised as a tort for the purposes of service out the jurisdiction. This 
does not create a new cause of action. In our view, it simply gives the correct legal label to one that 
already exists. We are conscious of the fact that there may be broader implications from our 
conclusions, for example as to remedies, limitation and vicarious liability, but these were not the 
subject of submissions, and such points will need to be considered as and when they arise.251 
 
The UK Supreme Court revisited confidentiality in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd..252The 
majority in PJS reinstated the injunction banning the British media from naming PJS and his 
partner (two well-known public figures) after PJS engaged in a sexual encounter with another 
couple. This other couple told their story to an English newspaper that sought to publish. The 
Court of Appeal quashed the injunction stating that “[c]laims for confidentiality generally fail 
once information has passed into the public domain.” 253  According to the Supreme Court 
majority, the Court of Appeal did not give “due weight to the qualitative difference in 
intrusiveness and distress likely to be involved in … [an] unrestricted publication by the English 
media in hard copy as well as on their own internet sites.”254 It may be a curiosity to reinstate 
this injunction considering part of the argument was that the identity of PJS (and his partner) was 
known in other jurisdictions as it had been widely circulated through internet platforms. The 
argument that the information was widely available failed, however, to accurately identify the 
relevant issue. Instead, the question was “whether an injunction would serve a useful 
purpose”.255 At the end of his judgment, Lord Mance offered the following explication: 
At the end of the day, the only consideration militating in favour of discharging the injunction is the 
incongruity of the parallel - and in probability significantly uncontrollable - world of the internet and 
social media, which may make further inroads into the protection intended by the injunction. Against 
that, however, the media storm which discharge of the injunction would unleash would add a different 
and in some respects more enduring dimension to the existing invasions of privacy being perpetrated on 
the internet.256 
As PJS was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to comment on the Vidal-Hall ruling with 
respect to the tort issue (leave to appeal on this issue being dismissed), the Court endorsed the 
Court of Appeal’s conclusion: 
It is right that the Supreme Court should on the present application express its own view on the 
correctness of the approach taken in the authorities discussed in the preceding paragraphs (paras 26-
32). In my opinion, the approach is sound in general principle. Every case must be considered on its 
particular facts. But the starting point is that (i) there is not, without more, any public interest in a 
legal sense in the disclosure or publication of purely private sexual encounters, even though they 
involve adultery or more than one person at the same time, (ii) any such disclosure or publication will 
on the face of it constitute the tort of invasion of privacy, (iii) repetition of such a disclosure or 
publication on further occasions is capable of constituting a further tort of invasion of privacy, even in 
250 [2015] EWCA Civ 311. 
251 Ibid [51]. 
252 [2016] UKSC 26 [PJS]. On the argument of confidentiality, Lord Neuberger summarised the state of the matter 
in this case: ‘if one was solely concerned about confidentiality, that point had indeed been passed in this case.’ [57] 
253 [2016] EWCA Civ 393, [35].  
254 PJS [35]  
255 Ibid [26]. 
256 Ibid [45]. 
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relation to persons to whom disclosure or publication was previously made - especially if it occurs in a 
different medium.257 
As it currently stands, misuse of private information stands as a tort action. Still, confidence 
remains a factor. In sum, confidence can arise: in contract (provisions relating to confidentiality); 
in tort (misuse of private information); or sui generis relationship of confidence which has been 
breached. The challenge will be how the tort and breach of confidence elements develop.258 One 
such challenge focuses on the voluntariness of the recipient of the confidence. In its 1974 report, 
the Law Commission expressed concern over the strategic use of breach of confidence; that is, 
the creation of "the unsolicited confidence" where the recipient of the information could not 
decide whether or not to assume the responsibility. 259  The caution raised continues to be 
pertinent: the recipient of the confidence should voluntarily accept this position; it cannot be 
foisted upon a person. The confidence or misuse of private information focuses upon the nature 
of the information. In so doing, there has been a movement away from the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. And yet, there are remnants of the relationship analysis; such as 
the close friendship between McKennit and Ash, the commercial relationship between the parties 
in the Prince of Wales decision. To note the point does not undercut the analysis of the 
information. Rather, acknowledge should also be made of the differing ways in which the 
analysis has been conducted.  
 
(v) Intentional infliction of mental distress 
Intentional torts, within the context of a tort law course, are usually the first topics covered. They 
are also less prevalent when compared to negligence-based torts. This is mentioned because the 
fact of publication in a defamation context (considered in Part III of the work) seems to 
constitute intention for the purposes of tort. Still intentional torts may have a place in claims to 
protect reputation. 
 
The action derived from Wilkinson v Downton has evolved into an action for intentional 
infliction of mental distress. In Ontario, the test for intentional infliction of mental distress was 
set out in Prinzo v Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care260 where Weiler J.A. adopted the test for 
the same action set out in the BC Supreme Court by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in 
Rahemtulla v. Vanfed Credit Union261:  
(i) conduct that is flagrant and outrageous;  
(ii) calculated to produce harm; and,  
(iii) resulting in a visible and provable injury.  
257 Ibid [32]. 
258 On this matter consider this summary: “The misuse action is distinct from breach of confidence, which is 
designed to protect confidential information or secrecy. There is, however, an overlap between the misuse of private 
information and breach of confidence actions. Many factual situations may give rise to viable claims in both causes 
of action; a misuse claim may be reinforced by a claim for breach of confidence; and the authorities relating to 
breach of confidence may have relevance to the newer cause of action”: Sir Mark Warby, Adele Garrick and Chloe 
Strong, “Misuse of Private Information” in N.A. Moreham and Sir Mark Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie The 
Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford: OUP, 2016), [5.12]. 
259 Working Paper No. 58, Breach of Confidence (London: HMSO, 1974), [53]: “there is some danger of persons 
communicating ideas in confidence with the sole object of laying the foundation for a future claim if the recipient of 
the information happens to use a similar idea; the recipient would, on using the similar idea, have great difficulty in 
proving that it was arrived at independently of the idea originally communicated to him.”   
260 (2002), 60 OR (3d) 474 (CA). 
261 (1984), 51 BCLR 200 (SC). 
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There is no requirement in this action for there to be a malicious act. Instead, the defendant may 
have conducted herself with reckless disregard as to whether or not shock would ensue. 262 
Unlike in defamation (which focuses on the potential for harm), there must be some provable 
injury. In the context of the internet and harm to reputation (amongst other aspects of the action) 
Jane Doe 464533 v ND263considered the matter (though the decision remains in question. Jane 
Doe 464533 contained compelling evidence (which was undisputed by the defendant who failed 
to attend the trial). Many cases may not have such direct evidence of conduct. And so, it remains 
an open question whether a plaintiff could argue that there was a negligent infliction of mental 
distress. McLachlin C.J. considered some loose boundaries on the matter in Mustapha v. 
Culligan of Canada Ltd.: “The law does not recognize upset, disgust, anxiety, agitation or other 
mental states that fall short of injury. I would not purport to define compensable injury 
exhaustively, except to say that it must be serious and prolonged and rise above the ordinary 
annoyances, anxieties and fears that people living in society routinely, if sometimes reluctantly, 
accept.”264 
 
VI. General Data Protection Regulation 
There has been more movement in the protection of personal data than in other areas of privacy 
protection. A major force in the regulation of this area has been the European Union. This trend 
looks primed to continue. The GDPR was passed as a regulation of the European Union in 2016 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679). It will come into force 25 May 2018. This regulation will affect all 
EU member states and does not need the national government of each member state to pass 
enabling legislation.  
 
For Canada, this regulation is significant because it is the successor to Directive 95/46/EC that 
was adopted in 1995 and came into effect on October 25, 1998. The Directive prohibits members 
of the European Union from transporting personal data to third countries that do not have 
adequate levels of privacy protection for personal information.265 In order to trade with EU 
member states, Canada had to put in place legislation pertaining to private sector organisations 
that collect, use or disclose personal information in the course of commercial activities. The real 
potential barrier to trade posed by the Directive created an incentive for Canada to adopt privacy 
legislation.266  Importantly with reference to the Directive, the GDPR states: “[the] objectives 
and principles of Directive 95/46/EC remain sound”.267 
 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 268  was the legislation 
passed in 2000 by the Canadian Parliament to ensure that steps were taken by private sector 
entities to securely handle personal data collected in the course of business. This legislation has 
262 Prinzo [44]. 
263 2016 ONSC 541. 
264 2008 SCC 27, [9]. 
265 Notably, the ‘safe harbour’ aspect of the Directive regarding information exchanged between the EU and the US 
was found to be invalid by the CJEU in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (Case C-362-14) (judgment of 6 
October 2015).  
266 For example, in 1991 the German Data Protector moved to block the transmission from Germany to Canada of 
personal information about Germans by Air Canada. The reason given for this action was that Canada did not 
possess private sector privacy laws to protect the information: Ian Lawson, Privacy and Free Enterprise: The Legal 
Protection of Personal Information In the Private Sector (Ottawa:  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1992), 73. 
267 Recital 9. 
268 S.C. 2000 c.5. 
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promulgated provincial acts aimed at personal data in various forms. 269 The legislation was 
subsequently approved of by the EU Data Protection Working Party Opinion 2/2001 on the 
adequacy of the Canadian Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act.270 And so, the 
GDPR will be highly relevant to the present discussion in the not-so-distant future.271 Of note at 
this point, Article 4 of the GDPR defines personal data widely: “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person 'data subject'; an identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person”.  
 
With the passage of the Directive and related legislation in Canada, new-found importance has 
been placed on personal data protection as a subset of privacy. There has been public concern 
regarding personal data protection; though it has likely been difficult to pinpoint. A 1992 survey 
conducted for Equifax Canada found that the majority of the public saw privacy as a 
fundamental right in Canadian society.  The public expressed concern over threats to their 
personal privacy and believed that consumers had lost all control over the way organizations 
used personal information.  The survey found that two-thirds of Canadians (66%) felt that a 
specific guarantee of personal privacy over personal information should be added to the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, providing a constitutional basis for asserting individual privacy 
rights. 272   A 1995 survey of Canadians found that the idea of businesses selling personal 
information without consent was viewed, almost unanimously (95%) as an invasion of 
privacy.273 These concerns form an historical background to the present study insofar as they 
speak to a public unease with the state of privacy (as an umbrella term). They also suggest that 
claims relating to privacy and attempts at expanding privacy protection should be anticipated.   
 
A question remains whether or not personal data protection will be a viable avenue for protection 
of reputation interests in Canada. With the GDPR and the fact that Canada would again need to 
earn approval from the European Data Protection Commissioner, it is difficult to state what the 
precise path will be. It may be that in Canada plaintiffs will elect to fit these claims under the 
developing torts and therefore avoid raising a complaint with the relevant Privacy 
Commissioner.  
 
In this final section, considerations will be outlined with a view to providing guidance leading up 
to the implementation of the GDPR and its potential impact on Canada insofar as data protection 
may be applicable to protection of reputation. At the end of this report there is an appendix that 
contains summaries of talks from the 2017 Computers, Privacy and Data Protection Conference 
in Brussels, Belgium, where the concerns regarding the GDPR were discussed.  
 
269 For example, Personal Information Protection Act S.B.C. 2003, c.63; Personal Health Information Protection 
Act S.O. 2004, c.3. 
270 5109/00/EN WP 39. 
271 It should also be noted that the definition of a data controller has been found to include a search engine: Vidal-
Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311 (leave to appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court on the tort issue 
refused 23 July 2015). 
272 Louis Harris and Associates in association in association with Alan F. Westin, The Equifax Canada Report on 
Consumers and Privacy in the Information Age (New York:  Louis Harris and Associates, 1992) 17. 
273 Public Interest Advocacy Centre and Federation of Quebec Consumer Groups, Surveying Boundaries:  
Canadians and their Personal Information (Ottawa: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1995). 
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(i) Right to be forgotten 
The ‘right to be forgotten’ has quickly developed as an area of equal interest and concern. The 
concept stems from the CJEU’s decision in Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia 
Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzalez.274 The case centred on 
the rights of data subjects pursuant to the Directive: it requires that personal data must be 
processed fairly and lawfully; collected for legitimate and specified reasons; adequate, relevant, 
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which it is collected: accurate, where necessary 
kept up-to-date, and; retained as identifiable data for no longer than necessary to serve the 
purposes for which the data were collected. In Google Spain, the CJEU laid down a presumption 
in favour of the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data: “[those] rights override, as a 
rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of 
the general public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s 
name”.275 This presumption could only be rebutted “if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as 
the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights 
is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its 
inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”276 The measurement here is 
not whether the information brought up by a “Google” search caused prejudice to the data 
subject; but rather, whether there is compatibility with the parameters set out in the Directive for 
the entirety of the period of the data processing in question.277 Compounding the challenge posed 
by this decision is the fact that Google and other entities are dealing with many de-listing 
requests. Guidance has been provided by the U.K.’s Information Commissioner’s Office.278 A 
checklist has been developed by Jaani Riordan in his book, The Liability of Internet 
Intermediaries.279 It should be noted that continue to be challenges with, for example, global 
versus territorial de-indexing.280 The topic remains one of concern because Article 17 of the 
GDPR enshrines this “right to be forgotten”.  
 
Google Spain stands out as a departure from the legal concepts of privacy discussed in section V 
above. Here, data protection “is a proactive right to control one’s personal data.”281 This is 
distinct from privacy as an action (in some form) that responds to an intrusion. The private law 
actions in privacy have developed lethargically compared to the ruling in Google Spain. Further 
speaking to that point, this decision, arguably, set a precedent that the CJEU will interpret law 
made prior to the issues before the court arising. To expand, the Directive being applied in 
Google Spain was created in 1995 – before much of the framework within which we currently 
work had its influence.282 The CJEU, without tempering the matter due to age of the Directive, 
establishes a few points. First, any law which is devised in this area would likely need to be 
providing a framework as well as more specific details. The framework would be instrumental in 
anticipating the developments in information technology (related to data processing) and 
therefore speaking to guidelines for interpreting these future instances. Second, the court may be 
274 Case C-131/12 (13 May 2014) (CJEU). 
275 Ibid [81], [99]. 
276 Ibid [97], [99]. 
277 Ibid [92]. 
278 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-reform/overview-of-the-gdpr/individuals-rights/the-right-to-
erasure/  
279 (Oxford: OUP, 2016), [10.228]. 
280 See further Ibid [10.230]ff. 
281 Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 149. 
282 In his opinion, Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen had recommended the CJEU interpret the matter with this fact 
in mind.   
 43 
                                                 
signalling that it sees its role as an active one: not only applying law, but also fitting (what will 
be) the Regulation to its contemporary circumstances. It may be expected that the court should 
work this way. It should be remembered, though, that there was widespread negative reaction to 
the decision; a ruling that could attract the ‘activist’ moniker. The point, here, is to draw out the 
landmark nature of the ruling within the context of an area of rapid innovation. 
 
Google Spain also prompts thought on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Crookes v 
Newton283 where the court ruled that hyperlinks in an article did not constitute publication in itself. 
Hyperlinks which linked to personal data about Mr. Costeja were required to be removed. The 
decision was grounded in the Directive’s Articles 12(b) and 14 which provided data subjects with: 
the right to obtain from the data controller “the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the 
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of the Directive …, in particular because of 
the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data” ; as well as the right to object to processing of data 
by “advancing compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation, save where 
otherwise provided by national legislation.”284 
 
The link to the Law Commission’s current project is that the ‘right to be forgotten’ presents an 
opportunity for another claim to protect reputation. Recall in Google Spain, Mr. Costeja was 
seeking to remove from internet searches the fact that he was bankrupt a number of years ago. 
This ‘action’ (if it might be loosely called such) aims to remove certain data from the public 
domain which may affect an individual’s reputation. Google Spain sparks thoughts on the 
significant movement of reputation management since 1936 when Sim v Stretch was decided. 
While more thorough engagement is adjacent to the present study, it contextualises, nonetheless, 
the considerations here. Internet communications are a new plain on which reputation 
management has become concerned.  
 
A further element of convergence is that both the Data Protection Directive and Canada’s 
compatible legislation, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, have 
been established at the behest of commercial interests, but also profess to provide individual 
rights of control over personal information. This tension has not become as prevalent in Canada 
(discussed in section 3 of the this part below). However, Google Spain did illustrate this tension:  
rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also 
the interest of the general public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s 
name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role 
played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified 
by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list of 
results, access to the information in question.285 
Aside from a public figure, a data subject’s right is supposed to override the economic and 
access to information interests, as a general rule. The conception put forward by the CJEU here 
seems to suggest that when privacy and data protection rights are in play, freedom of expression 
may displace these rights only when there is a public interest. Surely this is a high threshold with 
regards to free speech, the hallmark of a liberal democracy. In 2008, the CJEU first wrote of “the 
right that guarantees protection of personal data and hence of private life.”286 Furthermore, there 
remains a curious interaction between privacy and data protection: is the latter a subset of the 
former or adjacent to it? It would seem that there are different avenues available to the individual 
283 2011 SCC 47. 
284 Google Spain [76]. 
285 Google Spain [97]. 
286 Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU, [63]. 
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seeking to protect her reputation. This will be demonstrated more precisely in the next 
subsection. 
 
(ii) UK claims in defamation and data protection 
In the UK, recent cases have demonstrated a robust approach to litigating reputation matters. In 
these decisions claims are made which bring together the notions of protection of reputation and 
the disclosure of personal information (personal data).287 A key difference to keep in mind is 
whether the plaintiff (or data subject in data protection terms) must show damage. Section 14(4) 
of the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 requires the “data subject” to show she has suffered 
damage. This is distinct from the EU Directive which does not require establishing any prejudice 
against the data subject.288 What is not clear is whether defamation in the UK remains actionable 
per se289 because arguably some proof of harm is required. Still, as these two actions stand, there 
would seem to be at least an argument regarding disparity in what a plaintiff would need to prove 
when pursuing both actions in tandem. This may well factor into the final determination of which 
claims, if any, to pursue.  
 
In defamation, the defence of qualified privilege includes protection where there is a duty and 
corresponding interest in disclosing information. When this is the case, the decision in Clift v 
Slough BC290 illustrates that proportionality will be an operating factor. Ms Clift witnessed the 
damaging of some flowerbeds. She was threatened when she intervened. On the advice of the 
police, she called Slough's anti-social behaviour co-ordinator, Ms Rachid. The conversation went 
very poorly and angry words were exchanged. The claimant terminated the call and she 
subsequently wrote a very strongly worded letter of complaint about Ms Rachid's conduct. 
Slough investigated, and rejected the complaint. It found her behaviour to Rachid was violent 
and threatening. It placed a 'marker' against her name for 18 months. And her name was placed 
on a register of violent persons. Details were sent to those with whom Clift might have contact, 
and to four wide categories of people connected with Slough. Clift sued in libel. The Court of 
Appeal accepted that the council had an obligation to inform those other groups who provided 
services to Clift since she had uttered threats against a Council employee. The court ruled the 
council had advised an overly broad range of agencies in that Clift had been added to the Violent 
Persons Register and so had violated the claimant's privacy right. While overly broad 
dissemination may prove to be a problematic basis for determining legal protection, an important 
question is the interest of the intended audience. 
 
With data protection and defamation, the overlap arises because different aspects of privacy are 
protected (in UK terms, a right to private life as outlined in the ECHR).291 In HH Prince Moulay 
287 An overview of this topic can be found in Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society 
3rd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2016), Chapter 20. 
288 Google Spain [96]: “In the light of the foregoing, when appraising such requests made in order to oppose 
processing such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it should in particular be examined whether the data subject 
has a right that the information relating to him personally should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his 
name by a list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of his name. In this connection, it must be 
pointed out that it is not necessary in order to find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in the 
list of results causes prejudice to the data subject.” 
289 Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 requires plaintiffs to meet a threshold of “serious harm” in order to 
advance a claim. 
290 [2010] EWCA Civ 1484 application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused. 
291 Data protection and defamation are not intended to be an exhaustive pairing. There can be other claims such as 
misuse of private information coupled with a data protection claim as in ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2017] EWHC 328. 
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Hicham Ben Abdallah Al Alaoui of Morocco v Elaph Publishing Ltd,292 the Court of Appeal 
assessed Elaph’s argument that a data protection claim was “not legally sustainable because it 
was an attempt to fashion a remedy for damage to reputation where the law of defamation did 
not provide one”293 The court rejected this argument stating: 
I can see no good reason of principle why a claim under the DPA cannot be linked to a defamation 
claim, and why it should not be added by amendment if the test for amendment is otherwise met. In 
the present case Elaph contend that the article is not defamatory of the Prince. If that defence succeeds 
the DPA claim may found an appropriate alternative means of redress, although §8 of the Amended 
Particulars of Claim, which treats the damage arising under the two claims as effectively the same, 
will require some further thought by those advising the Prince.294 
Consider the situation where a member of the public sets up and operates a website which takes 
aim at specific lawyers who are viewed as disreputable. Can the lawyers sue in defamation or 
could there be a data protection claim? In Law Society v Kordowski295the court considered this 
question and granted a permanent injunction for the website to be shut down. Publishing of 
defamatory material through the website “Solicitors from Hell” which encouraged the public to 
write negative comments about lawyers, the court ruled, was by definition unlawful processing 
and material could be erased under s.14(1) of the UK’s Data Protection Act. Under s.4(4) of the 
Act, Kordowski acted as a “data controller” and therefore was required to comply with the data 
protection principles outlined in Part I of Schedule I, including: processing of personal data 
“fairly and lawfully” (the first data protection principle); personal data must be accurate and be 
kept up-to-date (the fourth data protection principle); personal data must be processed in 
accordance with the rights of data subjects under the Act (the sixth data protection principle). 
 
Kordowski is a noteworthy decision for the fact that Tugendhat J. rejected the Information 
Commissioner’s reasoning as to why the plaintiffs’ complaint fell outside the Office’s 
jurisdiction. The Commissioner wrote, in part: 
The inclusion of the "domestic purposes" exemption in the Data Protection Act (s.36) is intended to 
balance the individual's rights to respect for his/her private life with the freedom of expression. These 
rights are equally important and I am strongly of the view that it is not the purpose of the DPA to 
regulate an individual right to freedom of expression – even where the individual uses a third party 
website, rather than his own facilities, to exercise this. (The s.36 exemption clearly did not anticipate 
individuals using third party websites to carry out their 'personal' processing). The situation would 
clearly be impossible were the Information Commissioner to be expected to rule on what it is 
acceptable for one individual to say about another be that a solicitor or another individual. This is not 
what my office is established to do. This is particularly the case where other legal remedies are 
available – for example, the law of libel or incitement.…296 
Rejecting this statement of the law, Tugendhat J retorted: 
I do not find it possible to reconcile the views on the law expressed in the Commissioner's letter with 
authoritative statements of the law. The DPA does envisage that the Information Commissioner should 
consider what it is acceptable for one individual to say about another, because the First Data Protection 
Principle requires that data should be processed lawfully.  … where the DPA applies, if processing is 
unlawful by reason of it breaching the general law of confidentiality (and thus any other general law) 
there will be a contravention of the First Data Protection Principle within the meaning of s.40(1), and a 
breach of s.4(4) of the DPA. … The fact that a claimant may have claims under common law torts, or 
under HRA s.6, does not preclude there being a claim under, or other means of enforcement of, the 
DPA.297 
292 [2017] EWCA Civ 29. 
293 Ibid [21]. 
294 Ibid [44]. 
295 [2011] EWHC 3185. 
296 Ibid [96]. 
297 Ibid [100]. 
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Data protection claims are not precluded as a result of a concurrent claim in defamation (though 
the bar to double compensation noted above will still apply). As well, while there is an 
exemption for journalism, literature and the arts (s.32), Kordowski did not fall under this 
provision:  
“If there is a provision of the DPA which would give effect to Art 10 rights engaged in the activities of 
the Defendant, it would be s.32 (journalism, literature and art). Journalism that is protected by s.32 
involves communication of information or ideas to the public at large in the public interest. Today 
anyone with access to the internet can engage in journalism at no cost. If what the Defendant 
communicated to the public at large had the necessary public interest, he could invoke the protection 
for journalism and Art 10. But for reasons given in the many judgments in cases against him referred to 
in this judgment, he cannot make any such claim, nor any claim at all for the protection under Art 10 
for what he has communicated, because what he does is against the public interest. It has equally been 
established many time that the Defendant is responsible in law for what he communicates through the 
Website.”298 
 
As noted above, s.36 of the Data Protection Act includes an exemption for data processed for 
domestic purposes: “personal data processed by an individual only for the purposes of that 
individual’s personal, family or household affairs”. In Kordowski, this exemption did not apply 
because there was an eminently public basis for the defendant’s conduct. It may be surprising, 
though, how narrowly this exception has been interpreted. At the EU level, the applicable 
provision is Art.3(2) as it states that the Directive is inapplicable to data processing “by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.” In interpreting this provision, 
the CJEU has rendered two decisions which should be borne in mind when considering the 
implications of the GDPR for Canada with particular effect to protection of reputation.  
 
In Bodil Lindqvist v Sweden299, Ms. Lindqvist was a catechist at her parish in Sweden. She took a 
data processing course in order to enhance the online presence of her church. On the website she 
established for the church, she described her colleagues including family circumstances, personal 
telephone numbers and, in one case, the medical reason for one colleague being on half time 
work. She neither informed nor obtained the consent of these colleagues. The Swedish data 
protection authority charged her with breaching the Swedish Data Protection Act. The Swedish 
Court of Appeal referred the case to the CJEU. The CJEU interpreted the domestic purposes 
exemption as a provision that “must therefore be interpreted as relating only to activities which 
are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case 
with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data 
are made accessible to an indefinite number of people.” 300  Since she fell outside of the 
exemption, she was required to have processed the data fairly and lawfully.  
 
Several years later, the CJEU returned to this matter in Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních 
údajů.301 Mr. Ryneš installed a CCTV camera outside of his house as a security measure (a 
response to earlier vandalism of his property). The camera recorded movements on his own 
property as well as on the public sidewalk. The camera became useful when his house was once 
again attacked (windows being broken). The camera was used to identify two individuals; one of 
which queried the lawfulness of the camera’s position (capturing the public sidewalk). The 
Czech court referred the matter to the CJEU. The incident was found to fall within the purview 
of the Directive: the subject captured on camera constituted personal data and recording was 
298Ibid [99]. 
299 C-101/10 (6 November 2003). 
300 Ibid [47]. 
301 C-212/12 (11 December 2014). 
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found to be within the application of Art.3(1) (automatic processing of personal data). The Court 
ruled against Mr. Ryneš: 
“…the processing of personal data comes within the exception provided for in the second indent of 
Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 only where it is carried out in the purely personal or household setting 
of the person processing the data. Accordingly, so far as natural persons are concerned, correspondence 
and the keeping of address books constitute, in the light of recital 12 to Directive 95/46, a ‘purely 
personal or household activity’ even if they incidentally concern or may concern the private life of 
other persons. To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings covers, 
even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the 
person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely 
‘personal or household’ activity for the purposes of the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 
95/46.”302 
 
Article 2(2) of the GDPR contains the personal use exemption with wording that is largely 
similar to that found in the 1995 Directive. As a result, it seems as though the Lindqvist and 
Ryneš rulings will remain guiding considerations. We may apply the notion of the benefits for 
self-development that we ascribe to free speech in libel to the domestic purposes exemption. The 
stumbling block, however, appears to be when self-development moves into a public domain, 
such as the internet. For here the concern is when the individual becomes a data processer as in 
Lindqvist and Ryneš. However innocuous the means may be, there seems to be a healthy, 
cautious awareness of the thin line between an individual in a domestic circumstance and one 
moving beyond that situation.  
 
There are a few points to draw upon from this discussion of the data protection regime 
established by the EU Directive and implemented in the UK. The data protection regime has a 
remarkable capture area. For example, individuals may be data processers. There is a strict 
understanding of what separates the domestic purposes from a situation in which an individual is 
a data processer. This arises when there seems to be any sort of public engagement with people 
(data subjects) and the processing of the information gathered (publishing it on a website). A 
guiding factor for these decisions may be the data subjects lacked control over their personal 
data; something notable in Lindqvist.303  
 
(iii) Limitations of PIPEDA 
Based on the discussion in the section immediately preceding, the question is whether or not 
there is a similar option in Canada with regards to claims in both libel and data protection. The 
brief answer appears to be there is not. Looking at PIPEDA, the regime for personal data 
protection (personal information) does not offer similar options to plaintiffs seeking to protect 
their reputations. Mister Justice Sharpe in Jones highlighted this point when he wrote: “the 
remedies available under PIPEDA do not include damages and it is difficult to see what Jones 
would gain from such a complaint.”304 There does not seem to be an equivalent understanding of 
individuals being data processers as is found under the EU Directive (and by extension UK law). 
Below is an outline of PIPEDA ending with a brief assessment of the place of these claims 
within the spectrum of legal options to protect reputation. Again, this discussion is prompted by 
the aforementioned UK and EU decisions which do contemplate both libel and data protection 
options.  
 
302 Ibid [31]-[33]. 
303 Lynksey 146. 
304 Jones [50]. 
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The declared purpose of PIPEDA is: 
to establish, in an era in which technology increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of 
information, rules to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner  that 
recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information and the need of 
organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate in the circumstances.305  
This legislation recognizes the “right of privacy of individuals with respect to personal 
information”. PIPEDA applies to “every organization” that “collects, uses or discloses in the 
course of commercial activities” personal information. It also applies to “every organization” 
that holds personal information “about an employee of the organization and that the organization 
collects, uses or discloses in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or 
business”.306 PIPEDA has “quasi-constitutional status”.307 Pursuant to s.14, a complainant to the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPCC) may, after receiving a report from the 
OPCC, apply for a hearing in the federal court. The Act does not apply to government institutions 
to which the Privacy Act pertains; any personal information held by an individual for “personal 
or domestic purposes and does not collect, use or disclose for any other purpose”; or to any 
organization which collects, uses or discloses personal information for “journalistic, artistic or 
literary purposes” and for no other purpose.308 An organization to which PIPEDA applies must 
comply with its provisions. Assessment of compliance is on the objective standard: “for purposes 
that a reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the circumstances”.309 The court will 
adjudicate this matter by determining whether the collection, use or disclosure of personal 
information is directed to a bona fide business interest, and whether the loss of privacy is 
proportional to any benefit gained.310 A primary element of compliance with PIPEDA originates 
in obtaining consent from an individual. Consent can range from collection to use or disclosure 
of personal information granted by the individual. Consent may not be necessary if it falls within 
the parameters of s.7. It provides a lengthy list of exclusions enumerated under the heads of 
collection, use and disclosure.  
 
Section 6 requires that an individual or team be put in place to ensure compliance with PIPEDA. 
Section 13 speaks of the timeline for the Commissioner to issue a report if settlement between 
the parties is not achieved. A report is not binding. The Commissioner’s finding is more of a half 
measure since s.14 allows the Complainant or the Commissioner (with leave of the Court under 
s.15(c)) to request a hearing before the Federal Court, Trial Division on any matter on which the 
complaint was made. This application to the Court allows for a form of enforcement mechanism 
if the Court agrees with the Commissioner’s findings. The additional remedies available to the 
Court under PIPEDA are:  
 The Court may, in addition to any other remedies it may give,  
(a) order an organization to correct its practices in order to comply with sections 5 to 10;  
(b) order an organization to publish a notice of any action taken or proposed to be taken to correct its 
practices, whether or not ordered to correct them under paragraph (a); and  
(c) award damages to the complainant, including damages for any humiliation that the complainant 
has suffered.311  
305 PIPEDA, s.3. 
306Section 4(1) 
307 A.T. v Globe24h.com, [2017] FC 114, [91]. 
308Section 4(2) 
309Section 5(3) 
310 Turner v Telus Communications Inc, 2005 FC 1601, [48], aff’d 2007 FCA 21.  
311Section 16 
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Section 28 governs offences and punishment. In order to be found in contravention of PIPEDA, 
the applicant must establish that the respondent “knowingly” contravened the Act. The 
application of s.28 is further narrowed to only those who knowingly contravene s.8(8), s.27.1(1) 
or those who obstruct the Commissioner or his/her delegate in an investigation or in conducting 
an audit. These offences are punishable either by summary conviction and a fine not exceeding 
$10,000 or by indictable offence, liable for a fine not exceeding $100,000. With regards to 
damages pursuant to s.16 there has been no guidance through statute. At common law, three 
main functions have been identified regarding damages under PIPEDA: (1) compensation; (2) 
deterrence; and (3) vindication.312 This includes a non-exhaustive list of factors: “(1) whether 
awarding damages would further the general objects of PIPEDA and uphold the values it 
embodies; (2) whether damages should be awarded to deter future breaches; and (3) the 
seriousness of the breach”.313  
 
Analysing the utility of PIPEDA as a vehicle for protection of personal data is limited. It is not 
legislation that engages with “private rights of action between individuals.”314 Its origins are in 
facilitating commerce; a response to the EU’s Data Protection Directive. This is an important 
premise to remember since it diverges from the aims discussed with regards to the privacy-based 
actions noted above. It can also render a purposive approach difficulty. 315  A.T. v 
Globe24h.com,316 a decision of the Federal Court, suggests that there may be an opening for an 
interpretation of PIPEDA similar to that found in the CJEU decisions noted in the immediately 
prior section. The collection of information about individuals by the defendant culled from 
online court documents was found to be inappropriate because the collection, use and disclosure 
was not, on an objective assessment, for a bona fide business interest.317 In order to remove the 
information from the site, individuals were compelled to pay a large fee instead of waiting over 
150 days for the same action. In the court’s words, even though the information in question was 
freely available on court websites apart from Globe24h.com’s actions, the defendant’s conduct 
brought on “needless exposure of sensitive personal information of participants in the justice 
system via search engines.”318 Damages were awarded to A.T. in the amount of $5000 which 
was deemed “appropriate based largely on the conduct of the respondent. It is clear from the 
record that the respondent has commercially benefited from the breach through targeted 
advertising and by requiring a fee for removing the personal information of individuals contained 
in the decisions. The respondent has also acted in bad faith in failing to take responsibility and 
rectify the problem.”319  
 
It may be that in Canada the understanding of the data protection avenue for protection of 
reputation has developed slowly because these decisions of the Federal Court indicate that there 
is scope for redress pursuant to PIPEDA. As a result of the limited use of this Act, PIPEDA is 
equivocal legislation when it comes to protection of reputation. Its aims are dual: protection of 
312 Nammo v TransUnion of Canada Inc, 2010 FC 1284, [72]-[76].  
313 I Ibid [76]. 
314 Jones [51]. 
315 The Supreme Court of Canada had employed the purposive approach repeatedly in labour law decisions such as: 
BC Health and Ontario (Attorney-General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20; Mounted Police Association of 
Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC1; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 
4. 
316 2017 FC 114 [Globe24h.com] 
317 Ibid [91]. 
318 Ibid [74]. 
319 Ibid [101]. 
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personal data privacy and facilitation of the collection, use and disclosure of this data. 
Consequently, when the matter arises before the courts, adjudication at that level “must strike a 
balance between [these] two competing interests.”320 Recalling the decision in Jones v Tsige, a 
complaint to the Federal Privacy Commissioner (since the matter was one involving banks and 
this is a federally-regulated industry) was available to Jones. Tsige, seizing on this opportunity, 
contended that this and other legislation closed off any sort of common law action (such as 
intrusion upon seclusion). The Ontario Court of Appeal expressly rejected this argument.321 The 
ruling remains important for claims relating to personal data because it permits complainants to 





Defamation law (libel) initially developed as an action to protect reputation. Towards the end of 
the 20th century and into the early part of the 21st century, this tort evolved to protect a wider 
range of speech; a movement that served to recognize the importance placed on freedom of 
expression in modern liberal democracies. Also, emerging as the same time as we approached 
the end of the 20th century was an evolution in freedom of expression that included or was 
adjacent to freedom of information. However, just as we recognized a fettered right to speech so 
too is the understanding of access to information. There is a justifiable infringement of both, but 
it must be strong enough to displace what may be viewed as a presumption in favour of these 
rights. This presumption, though, is not inviolable; but the threshold remains one of the most 
contested areas in modern democracies.  
 
(i) Intrusion as an operating concept 
Privacy can be separated into physical privacy and information privacy. With regards to 
protection of reputation and internet-based forms of communication, attention focuses on 
information privacy.  
 
If there is a guiding term for the interconnection between privacy and defamation (especially in 
the social media context), it may be intrusion.322 Privacy here is about the protection of or 
respect for private life and intrusion is utilised (though there could be other conceptions)323 here 
to be an encompassing term. Writing about privacy, Mister Justice Eady observed: “it is 
important always to remember that the modern law of privacy is not concerned solely with 
information or ‘secrets’: it is also concerned importantly with intrusion”. 324  Intrusion also 
320 Englander v Telus Communications Inc. [2004] FCA 387, [46]. It is worth noting that in this case, the plaintiff 
had not been personally affected by the defendant. Still, the court made a “future-oriented” order requiring Telus to 
change its practices so as to comply with PIPEDA.  
321 Jones [50]-[51]. 
322 David Mangan ‘Regulating for Responsibility: Reputation and Social Media’ (2015) 29 International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology 16. 
323 In Goodwin v NGN Ltd. [2011] E.M.L.R. 27, [28], Tugendhat J. called the core components of private life 
confidentiality and intrusion. Offering another consideration, Roderick Bagshaw writes in “Obstacles on the Path to 
Privacy Torts” in Peter Birks (ed.) Privacy and Loyalty (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 133-144, 140: “The relationship 
between ‘intrusion’ and ‘disclosure’ is one of the most difficult to chart. Whether ‘disclosure’ is wrongful clearly 
turns to a large extent on the nature of the information disclosed, and the reasons for disclosing it. If there are forms 
of ‘intrusion’ which we regard as wrongful even if the purpose was to obtain information which could have been 
legitimately disclosed, then we must concede that ‘disclosure’ and ‘intrusion’ torts will protect different aspects of 
privacy, though the ‘intrusion’ tort could also sometimes protect the aspect protected by the ‘disclosure’ tort.” 
324 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB), [23] (emphasis in original). 
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appears to be a term of developing importance as suggested by Mister Justice Sharpe’s extensive 
use of the term in Jones v Tsige. The UK Supreme Court’s decision in PJS emphasises intrusion 
as a core aspect. The publication of information about an individual by another on his social 
media platform to a wide audience intrudes upon the claimant’s reputation in a notably personal 
way. In law, the intrusion may be viewed as a matter of privacy and/or as one of libel. There are 
faint signs of contemporaneous connection but taken together it would seem that legal 
developments in both countries are following a similar path. On the Canadian side, though, this 
is mostly attributable to Mister Justice Sharpe. His use of Prosser developed the concept of 
intrusion in Canadian privacy law. It is intrusion that has also been developed in the English law, 
but more extensively.  
 
The starting point for understanding intrusion as a central term must be Professor Prosser’s 
seminal 1960 article. In it, he outlined four distinct torts in the following manner:  
It is not one tort, but a complex of four. The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of 
four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise 
have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the 
plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, "to be let alone." Without any attempt to exact 
definition, these four torts may be described as follows: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.325 
Professor Prosser argued against the notion of intrusion being a connecting factor. Instead his 
contention was that there had been a failure to see the distinct elements amongst these four torts.  
Taking them in order-intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation- the first and second require 
the invasion of something secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff; the third and fourth do 
not. The second and third depend upon publicity, while the first does not, nor does the fourth, although 
it usually involves it. The third requires falsity or fiction; the other three do not. The fourth involves a 
use for the defendant's advantage, which is not true of the rest. Obviously this is an area in which one 
must tread warily and be on the lookout for bogs. Nor is the difficulty decreased by the fact that quite 
often two or more of these forms of invasion may be found in the same case, and quite conceivably all 
four.'"326 
These distinctions, though, do not overlook the similarities such as each of the torts, like libel, 
are actionable per se.  
 
There are separate and distinct aspects to these torts; however they are part of the range of 
actions available to plaintiffs to protect separate aspects of reputation against intrusion. They are 
connected in a few ways. For example, the right protected is individual and non-assignable. It 
protects the individual in the sense of personal integrity. However, there is no right against 
challenges to or questioning of that reputation.  
 
Looking at the first of Prosser’s torts, intrusion upon seclusion, we may discern a physical act of 
intrusion (such as surreptitiously entering a person’s house without invitation). This would be an 
intrusion that recalls the tort of trespass to land: there is an integrity which is breached upon 
entry that does not require there to be any actual damage inflicted. And yet, we may query the 
point further: why would an individual want to preserve a place of seclusion? As noted earlier, 
there are certain matters we would prefer to keep to ourselves. The reasons for this may vary. We 
may wish to preserve a place of solitude; though the likelihood of this in fact being a place of 
325 Prosser 389 (references omitted). 
326 Prosser 407-408 (references omitted). 
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solitude (rather than a place of exclusion where some individuals enter) may be questioned. 
More often, there are certain matters we keep to ourselves because we do not want others to 
make judgements. This is a point about reputation. Ms Tsige would not want any unauthorized 
individual to check her bank account because, if just anyone can see this, judgements can be 
made based upon its contents.  
 
The second privacy tort for Prosser is public disclosure. The essence of the tort is that some 
personal information has been made public. The means by which this information was obtained 
may itself be the subject matter of another privacy tort such as intrusion upon seclusion or breach 
of confidence. The fact of public disclosure, though, means that unwanted attention has been 
invited upon the innocent party; that is, there has been intrusive attention foisted upon the 
individual. Again, the basis for keeping this information from the public domain will likely bear 
upon reputation considerations.  
 
The third privacy tort “consists of publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public 
eye”,327 whether it is attributing a poor piece of writing to a famous author (as was the example 
of Lord Byron used by Prosser) or the unlicensed use of a photo of an individual to promote a 
product. Prosser identifies the reputation interests involved in this tort. In terms of intrusion, the 
emphasis is on the unwarranted, sordid attention regarding one's reputation/name. 
 
Finally there is appropriation (specifically of an aspect of the plaintiff’s identity). This tort is 
usually committed with some form of gain in mind. While Prosser contends there is no matter of 
intrusion here, it is suggested that this is indeed a matter of intrusion into reputation: 
appropriating an individual's identity for financial gain (because that identity facilitates it) or for 
purposes of sullying that individual's reputation. This tort seems to have more of a proprietary 
element; 328  a good name is a matter of goodwill or a commodity upon which to 
trade. Appropriation may overlap with defamation as it did in Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons Ltd.329 
The plaintiff was a prominent amateur golfer who recovered damages for the unauthorized use of 
his photograph in an advertisement by the defendant. The basis for the successful defamation 
claim was that the insinuation Tolley was paid for using his image would jeopardise his amateur 
standing. The Ontario Court of Appeal protected the commercial use of an individual’s name 
(including his likeness, voice and reputation) without the individual’s permission in Krouse v 
Chrysler Canada Ltd. 330 Krouse underscores that intrusion is at the heart of Prosser’s 
appropriation tort because it vindicated the plaintiff’s control over the use of his name as linked 
to its commercial value. There is a space against which unauthorized incursions are protected.  
 
The above elaboration of the unifying premise of intrusion may appear to stretch the centrality of 
the term. A further reason for using intrusion is the importance of an accessible unifying 
element. What is meant by this is that there is a real potential for efforts to protect reputation to 
take the law into divergent terrain. The hope is that intrusion may serve the purpose of being a 
term of reference moving forward which encapsulates some element of widespread 
understanding when it comes to protection of reputation.  
327 Prosser 398. 
328 This conception is echoed by Robert Post who saw reputation as a type of property where an individual builds up 
her reputation through hard work: Robert Post, “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the 
Constitution” (1986) 74 California Law Review 691. 
329 [1931] A.C. 333. 
330 (1970), 1 O.R. (2d) 225. 
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This discussion of intrusion may be set within a framework of high and low expectations of 
privacy. The aforementioned decisions speak to a spectrum of protection for private information; 
that is, there is a range to the expectation of privacy that spans high to low. One point that 
emerges clearly from the UK decisions is that courts will be vigilant regarding intrusion where 
children are involved. 331  Furthermore, there seems to be a jurisdictional element to these 
decisions. Looking again at PJS, the injunction was maintained within the jurisdiction even 
though the information could be obtained in other jurisdictions. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Equustek Solutions Inc. v Google Inc.,332 where the court maintained an 
injunction barring Google from permitting the defendants’ websites from coming up in search 
options, adds to this discussion insofar as it states that jurisdictions (and in keeping with s.92 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867) may be maintained even on the borderless internet.  
 
To further illustrate intrusion, consider the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in 
Bărbulescu v Romania.333 While the pleadings in Bărbulescu asserted a violation of privacy 
rights, the majority’s remarks on this topic prompts further consideration in relation to protection 
of speech within the workplace. And so, there are two further points from the decision that 
situate the case and ground the ensuing critique. Mr Bărbulescu was terminated from his 
employment as an engineer in charge of sales for the personal use of a Yahoo Messenger account 
he had set up for the purpose of clients’ inquiries.334 During a period of a work week, his 
employer had monitored his account and found that he had exchanged messages with his fiancée 
and brother. The employer had also monitored a personal Yahoo Messenger account in which 
there were exchanges between Bărbulescu and his fiancée. The basis of his termination was for 
breach of the company’s internal regulations prohibiting such activity, namely the following 
provision: “It is strictly forbidden to disturb order and discipline within the company’s premises 
and especially … to use computers, photocopiers, telephones, telex and fax machines for 
personal purposes.”335 The employer’s termination was upheld at all levels of court, up to and 
including the ECtHR. From a strict construction of the facts, some form of discipline may have 
been justified since Bărbulescu had put into evidence, during disciplinary proceedings, that he 
had not used Yahoo Messenger for personal purposes at the office.336   
 
Still, a difficulty with Bărbulescu stems from what seems to be a casual assessment of these 
facts. Employer monitoring of his accounts (work and personal) was justified because it was 
limited in scope (seemingly because it consisted of one work week).337 There was no evidence of 
the employer suspecting the use of company time for personal messages. Nevertheless, 
monitoring these accounts was reasonable “for an employer … to verify that the employees are 
completing their professional tasks during working hours.” 338  These points require further 
consideration (discussed in the ensuing paragraphs) than was provided by the Court. And yet, the 
questions continue. The text of Bărbulescu’s messages was produced in court, including those 
from his personal account. Even this was justifiable because the content of the communications 
331 See for example the PJS and Murray decisions. 
332 2015 BCCA 265. 
333 Application 61496/08 [Bărbulescu]. A hearing by the Grand Chamber started 30 November 2016.  
334 In Romania, home internet access is notoriously slow; whereas workplaces have better connections. And so, 
individuals tend to check social media (for example) at work.  
335 Bărbulescu [8]. 
336 Ibid [10]. 
337 Ibid [60]. 
338 Ibid [59].    
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was not a decisive factor in the domestic courts’ decision.339 The fact of disclosure elicited no 
consideration.  
 
Moving to the decision itself, first, for the ECtHR, the issue before it was “whether, in view of 
the general prohibition imposed by his employer, the applicant retained a reasonable expectation 
that his communications would not be monitored.”340 It cannot be said that Bărbulescu had an 
expectation of privacy while at work. The ECtHR made this clear when it found “that it was not 
unreasonable for an employer to want to verify that the employees are completing their 
professional tasks during working hours.”341 Instead, as alluded to above, there were no specific 
grounds for monitoring Bărbulescu’s messages. It must be wondered if the Court was giving 
effect to a general power for employers to intrude upon a worker’s privacy, regardless of reason. 
Furthermore, the evidence of a first warning was dubious; putting aside that incremental 
discipline has long been a standard workplace practice.  
 
Second, the court examined the case from the “standpoint of the State’s positive obligations 
since he was employed by a private company, which could not by its actions engage in state 
responsibility under the Convention.”342This was an important case for the ECtHR to take up. 
The starting point of the employer was entirely within reproach: an absolute ban on personal 
communications at work acts as a strict liability approach to worker discipline that is entirely 
unrealistic. A role remains for the State’s positive obligations in this instance. This case 
evidenced a selective interpretation of intrusion: the right of an individual was trumped by 
commercial interests (as expressed through an absolute ban on non-work internet access at the 
workplace). Employment law will likely be a source of further consideration of these issues.343 
In that setting there are persistent efforts to contract out of having to deal with the foibles of 
people. The handmaiden of this approach is the measurement of harm: what harm has the worker 
caused to the employer. Bărbulescu, we must infer, wasted company time and resources. And 
yet, this approach entirely ignored that there were other considerations. Work is an important 
part of an individual’s life; but it is not the entirety of that life. Personal matters may arise at any 
time: whether that is a family emergency during working hours or a moment to step away344 
from one work item in order to start another. To be clear, there is no endorsement here of lazy 
work habits. Rather, there is an acknowledgement that people occupy jobs and as a result there 
are certain matters which (try as we might) cannot be eradicated by precatory rules.  
 
If we endeavour to surmise the path charted for protection of reputation, there is an unclear map 
provided by the law. Google Spain illustrates. In Google Spain, the CJEU did not mention Art.11 
of the EU Charter. It also described access to information by the internet as an “interest” rather 
339 Ibid [58]. 
340 Ibid [42]. 
341 Ibid [59]. 
342 Ibid [53] 
343  David Mangan, “Social media in the workplace” in David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies (eds) The Legal 
Challenges of Social Media (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017). Employment law has not been considered here as it 
was understood to have diverted attention from the Commissions primary aim, protection of reputation. It is viewed 
as a future potential source of consideration because of its connection with the dignity of the person as expressed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Re: Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 368: “[a] 
person's employment is an essential component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being.” 
344 According to one report from the United States, 34% of those surveyed used social media to ‘take a mental break 
from work’: K Olmstead, C Lampe and N B Ellison, ‘Social Media and the Workplace’ Pew Research Center (22 
June 2016) http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/06/22/social-media-and-the-workplace/  
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than a right. This classification gives rise to a general rule that a “data subject’s right to privacy 
and data protection override the interest of Internet users in having access to information.”345 
Lynskey concludes: “the Court appears to assume that when the rights to privacy and data 
protection are at stake the right to freedom of expression extends only to ‘public interest’ 
information as opposed to information in which the public may have an interest.”346 Applying 
this line of thinking to the present project in Canada, there is a question as to whether or not 
Canadian courts would view this hierarchy of privacy as data protection being preserved at the 
expense of a more robust freedom of expression. It may be that the matter is more about access 
to information in the CJEU’s conception. However, the difficulty with this is that the premise of 
free speech is the sharing of information through remarks. It would seem difficult to parse 
freedom of expression from freedom to information. This is a challenging balance as it seems 
that there is concern that freedom to information will form an end-run around privacy. However, 
a statement suggesting that freedom of expression is to be subservient to a right of privacy will 
encounter some significant challenges in response.  
 
(ii) Reputation: the legal means for redress 
The challenge in Ontario (and by extension Canada) is that the notion of privacy remains 
rhisomatic. There is much reliance on UK law in the area of breach of confidence. In privacy, 
there has been adoption of Prosser’s four privacy torts (as stated in the American Restatement of 
the Law (Second) Torts). If the matter remained at that point, perhaps the area would be more 
clear. However, there seems to be further reliance upon the English law based upon how breach 
of confidence has developed. While Canada has not reached this point, English law has 
developed the tort of misuse of personal information from the origins of the action in breach of 
confidence. Given the continuing close linkage between Canadian and English private law 
(notably contract and tort),347 it is foreseeable that a similar tort will develop in Canada. This 
would then leave the quandary of how the Prosser privacy torts and the English misuse of 
personal information tort may co-exist. Just as foreseeable is that this matter will take some time 
to develop. For this reason, it is suggested that a focus on clarifying the purposes of these actions 
is necessary. The UK Law Commission, in 1974, put the rationale for establishing clarity in 
prescient terms: “The question of the basis of the jurisdiction is not any longer a matter of 
particular importance in establishing the existence of the jurisdiction; the cases themselves 
provide ample authority. But it remains a vital question in forecasting the future development of 
the law. No one can say with any assurance how a particular issue will be decided in the future if 
it is not certain, for instance, whether the courts will apply equitable or tort principles.”348 The 
Ontario Court of Appeal’s interpretation in Chippewas of the fusion of equity and common law 
as a matter requiring on-going adaptation to the contemporary circumstances points to a broad 
range of remedies for the courts. Still, there should be some clarity as to the aims of the actions, 
putting aside the remedial action courts may take.  
345 Lynskey 147-148 
346 Ibid 150. 
347 Canadian common law is largely derived from the UK and continues to borrow from it. For example, J.D. 
students will study the Canadian law of contract; but many of the cases studied are English. This is not to say all 
Canadian law is strictly adherent. Canadian law diverged from UK tort law with the retention of Lord Wilberforce’s 
duty of care analysis in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641. The House of Lords in Murphy v. Brentwood 
District Council, [1991] 1 A.C. 338 overruled Anns. Still, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Cooper v. 
Hobart [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 recalls the cautious approach to the duty of care analysis by the House of Lords in 
Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605. 
348 Working Paper No. 58, Breach of Confidence [40]. 
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VIII. Summation 
This research aims to provide the Commission with guidance regarding actions to protect 
reputation beyond defamation. Common law avenues have been primarily pursued as this seems 
to be the more likely route for more immediate development; though statutory routes have been 
discussed also. This study has kept in mind how this research relates to the Commission’s 
mandate for this project.   
 
The Commission has aptly identified the intersection between privacy and defamation as an area 
for discussion within its project. Research has been conducted focusing on the developing law 
pertaining to privacy. Privacy is explored through privacy as a concept as well as current legal 
formulations in Canada (particularly Ontario). Connected to this analysis is the action in breach 
of confidence. In relation to both privacy and breach of confidence, legal developments in the 
UK have been explored. The reasons for this include: the significant foundation that English law 
has and continues to play in Canadian law as well as the fact that these areas have developed 
quite a bit in the UK (such as claim in misuse of private information). Finally, UK law has 
developed a further area for reputation redress through data protection. This is largely due to the 
influence of the UK (until 2019) being a member of the European Union. These three areas 
(privacy, breach of confidence and data protection) have been explored insofar as they pertain to 







(i) Speeches from the Computers, Privacy and Data Protection Conference, Brussels, Belgium 
25-27 January 2017.349 
 
In a keynote address at the Computers, Privacy and Data Protection Conference in Brussels in 
2017, Vera Jourova, European Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality,350 
spoke of the European Commission’s expectations regarding the GDPR. Overarching the speech 
were certain guiding principles including: the need to harmonise rules; a greater level of certainty 
for businesses and those who handle data. This speech confirmed what to many developed 
countries seems to have emerged as the case: Europe is a world leader in protection in personal 
data and sees itself as a “digital single market”. With regards to implementation Commissioner 
Jourova identified four point. First, the Commission must work with member states to make sure 
that legislation will be harmonised. Second, coherent enforcement, though challenging because 
Data Protection Agencies in Europe are autonomous, must be achieved. Associated with this 
point, the third matter is discretion power for imposing sanctions with some form of equivalency 
across the single market. Finally, there is acknowledgement that there must be buy-in by those 
who fall under the regulation. To this end, the Commission must explain and inform businesses 
and citizens as to how to apply the regulation in the day to day. This purpose is currently being 
served by the Article 29 working party (its report will be published by mid-2017).  
 
Bruno Gencarelli, Head of the Data Protection Unit at the European Commission, spoke about 
the adequacy regime for third countries (of which Canada would be one). 351  He stated: 
“Adequacy is not about being a photocopy.” For him, the effective implementation of privacy 
rights requires a foreign system to deliver similar protection; what was called “essential 
equivalence”. The Schrems decision was identified as demonstrated different means of providing 
this similar level of protection. The process of gaining this status commences when a foreign 
government expresses interest. He envisioned such an approach being undertaken by a 
government in conjunction with its Data Protection agency with expression of interest coming 
from “quite a high political level.”  
 
Gencarelli seemed to admit to a certain level of fluctuation in the term adequacy. He commented: 
“Adequacy is a finding at a certain point in time. A country can evolve. An adequacy decision is 
a living document and must be monitored.” The elements considered in a ruling regarding 
adequacy can be found through the work of the Article 29 Working Party. As well, Art. 45 of the 
GDPR contains a detailed list of items to be considered. An emphasis was placed upon 
equivalence not meaning being symmetrical or a point to point duplication. Rather, the key 
principles of the GDPR must be addressed; but protection can be reached by different means.  
 
As has been the case with many EU initiatives, there are critics. In the same panel on which 
Gencarelli appeared there were two other panel members who drew out the criticisms of the 
349 The conference website is: http://www.cpdpconferences.org  
350 “Implementing the Data Protection Regulation” Computers, Privacy and Data Protection, Brussels, Belgium, 
January 25, 2017. This keynote address is found at the start of the following video: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBBSOS9GvNA  
351 “EU Adequacy Status for International Data Transfers” Computers, Privacy and Data Protection, Brussels, 
Belgium, January 25, 2017. This speech is found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DylC9xCSskU  
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adequacy process. Daniel Cooper of Covington and Burling (UK) outlined five concerns or 
criticisms: 
• Lack of certainty: question of investing resources 
• Lack of adequacy of measures: measures are not good for facilitating data transfer across 
jurisdictions  
• Lack of uniformity: Data Protection Agencies have different standards (though he noted 
the consistency mechanism in GDPR may resolve this)  
• Lack of alacrity: mechanisms are slow in coming into place. There are vew known 
adequacy determinations completed by the EU Commission.  
• Lack of transparency: industry would benefit from understanding the timeframes and 
clarity as to adequacy measures.  
Another line of critical engagement came from Professor Kristina Irion, a Senior Researcher at 
the Institute for Information Law at the University of Amsterdam and an Associate Professor at 
the School of Public Policy at the Central European University. She contended that the language 
of the GDPR remains vague. The vagueness jeopardizes the preference private businesses have 
in keeping personal data (such as servers) in EU countries. They do so because the current 
Directive reduces legal uncertainty. Therefore, EU has become a major locale for data servers. 
Not only a legal problem plus the Snowden revelations (pulls the trust out of the market).  
 
(ii) A note on U.K. law 
Given the outcome of the 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, 
there is a potential for the law to change insofar as it pertains to the present research. It may be of 
interest to note that there seems to have been a recent movement towards developing horizontal 
direct effect with regards to certain rights; that is, enforcement of rights may not necessarily be 
limited to government conduct. For a Canadian audience, this may be similar to the Supreme 
Court of Canada writing of Charter values permeating into private sector scenarios. (cite Craig’s 
privacy and charter values piece from McGill?) 
 
Recent decisions of English appellate courts have elaborated upon the horizontal direct effect of 
rights. These cases do not necessarily establish a concrete rule. They do set a course for further 
consideration of the topic. In this manner the decisions line up with the argument that there is 
horizontal direct effect of public rights in private law circumstances. The Court of Appeal in 
Benkharbouche & Anor v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan352 outlined the horizontal direct 
effect of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2004 (effective 
remedy for a violation of a right). The court grounded its decision in the more recent case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In particular, the English court took note of 
the CJEU’s decision in Kucukdeveci v Swedex GmbH and Co KG353 which found that non-
discrimination (here, age discrimination) was a general principle of EU law to which effect must 
be given horizontally. This decision effectively extended the principle from Mangold v Helm354 
to the equivalent Charter provision. However, in CGT (Union Association de mediation sociale v 
Union locale des syndicats CGT, 355 the CJEU found that workers’ right to information and 
consultation (Article 27) did not have horizontal direct effect without enabling national 
352 [2015] EWCA Civ 33 [Benkharbouche]. The reasoning here was applied in the later Court of Appeal decision in 
Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311 [105]. Leave to appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court was 
granted 23 July 2015 on this issue.  
353 Case C-555/07 [2010] All ER (EC) 867. 
354 Case C-144/04 [2005] ECR I-9981. 
355 Case C-176/12 [2014] ICR 411. 
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legislation. Article 47 was distinguished as a provision that did not require national legislation to 
be effective. And so, the question remains ‘which rights and principles contained in the Charter 
might be capable of having horizontal direct effect and which would not.’356 The Benkharbouche 
Court ruled that Article 47 was ‘enshrined … as a general principle of Union law’357 based upon 
the aforementioned CJEU decisions coupled with explanations accompanying the Charter.358 
These decisions suggest scope for the argument that speech rights permeate the public/private 
divide. Article 11 (free speech) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
2004 would seem to be one of the general principles of EU law (akin to Article 47 in 
Benkharbouche). Despite departure from the European Union, free speech remains an important 
right that has garnered persistent attention; for example the efforts to reform defamation law lead 
to the passage of the Defamation Act 2013 that codified (among other points) the common law 
defences.  
 
The status of certain rights can give effect to opportunities for individual development. On that 
point, the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Preddy v Bull359 (notably Baroness Hale) discussed 
the concept of rights permeating into the private setting. The Court unanimously found that the 
couple (Mr and Mrs Bull) who owned and operated a private hotel had discriminated against the 
same sex couple (Mr Preddy and Mr Hall) by refusing them a room with a double-bed. While the 
Bulls were religious and objected on those grounds, Parliament had stepped in ‘to secure that 
people of homosexual orientation were treated equally with people of heterosexual orientation by 
those in the business of supplying goods, facilities and services.’ 360 The importance of this 
measure stems from the notion of individual personhood: ‘[s]exual orientation is a core 
component of a person’s identity’. 361  Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v 
Information Commissioner362 suggests that English courts may be willing to use the common 
law in order to give effect to rights. In that decision, the majority discussed the ‘common law 
presumption of openness’;363 though the dissent’s scepticism should be noted.  
 
Gathered together, these appellate level rulings fall short of unequivocal statements on future 
directions. Nevertheless, they do suggest a willingness by English courts to move in a direction 
of giving effect to rights in both horizontal and vertical manners.  
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363 Kennedy [47]. Consider Lord Mance’s statement: ‘Since the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, there has too 
often been a tendency to see the law in areas touched on by the Convention solely in terms of the Convention rights. 
But the Convention rights represent a threshold protection; and, especially in view of the contribution which 
common lawyers made to the Convention’s inception, they may be expected, at least generally even if not always, to 
reflect and to find their homologue in the common or domestic statute law.’ 
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